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Abstract 
 
Hedge funds have emerged as prominent players in the global financial markets during past few 
decades. Their trading has a sizeable impact on markets, as they trade more actively than mutual 
funds and constantly seek profit opportunities in less liquid markets. They have, however, faced 
significant headwinds since the financial crisis, as their returns have deteriorated and new 
regulatory measures have been introduced, even though no study directly linked the cause of the 
crisis to hedge funds. In Europe, the answer was the Alternative Investment Fund Managers’ 
Directive (AIFMD).   
 
Although the directive targets alternative investment fund (AIF) industry as whole, it was originally 
designed to regulate hedge funds and private equity. The directive is a comprehensive regulatory 
overhaul, which brings the previously lightly regulated AIF-industry under strict supervision. It 
seeks to harmonize alternative investment regulation across Europe, with the objectives of 
enhancing investor protection, mitigating systemic risk and facilitating cross-border distribution of 
funds. 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of AIFMD on European hedge fund industry. The 
impact assessment is conducted by qualitatively assessing some of the latest industry surveys on the 
topic. The results are interpreted alongside a thorough examination of the content of the directive. 
The study takes a pragmatic approach to the subject, and practical consequences of the most 
important provisions are provided. 
 
Some of the key findings of this research are following. The directive has a overwhelmingly negative 
impact on smaller hedge funds, as the borders of entry to the industry are substantially increased, 
and due to increased costs, the directive is almost an existential threat to some funds. Larger funds, 
however, may stand to benefit from the directive as they have the infrastructure in place 
accommodate the costs and take advantage of the benefits such as the AIFMD passport. As the 
directive has been in force for only a short period of time, it’s impact on systemic risk and investor 
protection remains ambiguous. As such, the hedge fund industry as whole,  also remains skeptical 
on the directive. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1.  Background 
 
Hedge funds have gained political and economic prominence during the past three decades. 
Economically, hedge funds have grown over 50-fold globally in terms of assets under management 
(AUM) since 1990.1 This translates to slightly over three trillion dollars of investable funds.2 
Although this amount is small relative to the total assets3 under management by mutual funds, it is 
large enough to move markets, and in the aftermath of the financial crises, big enough to concern 
regulators. In recent years, trading by hedge funds has accounted for over 50% of the daily trading 
volume in equities markets. They also account for over 80% of credit derivative trading and have 
close ties to financial institutions due to their prime broker relationship. Accordingly, hedge funds 
have become crucial providers of liquidity and drivers of price formation in global financial markets.4 
However, since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), hedge funds have faced significant headwinds. 
Their returns have significantly deteriorated due to increased competition and fewer trading 
opportunities, which makes it hard to justify the generous remuneration structures they employ.5 In 
addition, regulators worldwide have started to pay them increased attention and have introduced 
among other measures, registration requirements, limits on leverage, and more disclosure. 
Nevertheless, no study or regulator directly linked the cause of the GFC to hedge funds.6 
Opinions on the impact of hedge funds on the creation and progression of the crisis are highly diverse. 
On one side critics argue hedge funds as prominent players in the unregulated shadow banking 
system, contributed in a substantial manner to the formation of the speculative bubble in American 
mortgage market and thus created along with other things the preconditions for financial crisis7, others 
claim while they didn’t cause the crisis they amplified the impact especially through the use of 
leverage, speculative short selling and sudden fire sales to in order to meet investor redemption 
                                                         
1 Lucia Quaglia, The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Political Economy of Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union, 2011 West 
European Politics, 34:4, pp. 665-682 
2 Preqin, The 2015 Preqin Global Hedge Fund Report, 2015, pp. 6 
3 For instance Vanguard, the largest mutual fund in the world, has over three trillion AUM. See 
https://about.vanguard.com/ 
4 Working Document of the Commission Services (DG Internal Market) Consultation Paper on Hedge Funds. 
5 Yogi Dewan, There are too many hedge fund billionaires, Financial Times, 2015 
6 Indeed, the famous De Larosière Report deemed that hedge funds didn’t play a major part in creating the crisis. 
However, they did play their part in worsening it, notably through transmission function by massive selling of shares 
and short-selling transactions. See The High-level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: Report. February 2009, 
pp. 24 
7 G.Gorton et al. Regulating the Shadow Banking System, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 279, 2010 
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demands.8 Others support the assertion that hedge funds not only reduced the detrimental effects of 
the crisis but even boosted economic recovery.910   
Politically, the activity of hedge funds had come into the spotlight long before the financial crisis, 
due to the role they played in the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and after the failure of Long-term 
capital management (LTCM) in the US in 1998.11 The Asian financial crisis was a prime example of 
hedge fund herding behaviour12, risks generated from massive leveraged short sales and subsequently 
fire sales stemming from deleveraging. 13 The LTCM case brought forward to regulatory attention 
the systemic risks posed by overleveraged funds. Despite the aforementioned events, hedge funds 
remained largely unregulated or minimally regulated prior to GFC.14 
There were three important events which shifted the regulatory atmosphere towards pro-regulation. 
First, the failures of two Bear Stearns hedge funds, which were majorly invested in the US subprime 
mortgage market, reheated the discussion on hedge fund leverages and potential repercussions hedge 
fund failures can cause to the overall stability of the entire financial system.15 Second was the 
implosion of Lehman Brothers, which marks the dawn of GFC.  Third was the large-scale fraud 
perpetrated by Bernard Madoff16, which brought into question, in particular, the integrity of some of 
the industry practices.17 The events combined caused massive amounts of investments to vanish into 
thin air and resulted in unprecedented amounts of new regulation. The new approach was underlined 
by G20 in the 2009 London summit, where the leaders agreed that systemically important hedge funds 
would be brought under regulatory oversight for the first time.18 
                                                         
8 IOSCO, Hedge Funds Oversight; Final Report 7 n, 2009 
9 H.B. Shadab, Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis, No. 34 Mercatus on Policy, 2009 
10 Dirk A. Zetzsche  (ed.), The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, Wolters Kluwer, Law & Business, 
2012, pp. 21-36 
11 Quaglia, supra at 1, 2011 
12 Herding happens when funds mimic other funds or financial institutions while their own private information or 
proprietary models suggest other behaviour. See Hossein Nabilou and Alessio M. Pacces, The Hedge Fund Regulation 
Dilemma: Direct vs. Indirect Regulation, 6 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 183, 2015 
13 Quaglia, supra at 1, 2011 
14 Although there was no direct European legislation on the funds themselves, the various service providers within the 
hedge fund industry were subject, to varying degrees, to numerous European Directives. See Ch. 3, 3.1 on Hedge fund 
regulation prior to AIFMD also Ch. 2, 2.3 Hedge fund regulation for rationale behind minimum regulation approach 
15 The bankruptcy of Bear Stearns could be only averted by regulator-initiated and –sponsored acquisition through JP 
Morgan Chase. There was little collateral damage to the financial system at the time though. See Zetzsche, 2012, supra 
at 10. 
16 It is a common misperception that Madoff operated a hedge fund or series of hedge funds, even among policymakers. 
There was never a “Madoff fund” and Madoff never claimed to be a hedge fund manager. See G. Gregoriou & F. 
Lhabitant, Madoff; A riot of Red Flags, EDHEC Business School, 2009 
17 Both the Madoff fraud and collapse of Lehman highlighted existing differences between EU member states with 
regard to depositaries’ safekeeping duties and liabilities, thus EC developed a strong desire to clarify and harmonize the 
depositary function at EU level. See Ch. 4, 4.1 Depositary and Zetzsche, 2012, pp. 409-446 
18 London summit, Leaders’ statement, 2009 
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In Europe, the answer was the Alternative Investment Fund Managers’ Directive (AIFMD, 
2011/61/EU), which was enacted to regulate in particular the fund managers19, instead of the funds 
itself. It establishes common requirements governing the authorization and supervision of AIFMs in 
order to provide a coherent approach to the related risks and their impact on investors and markets in 
the Union.20 The overarching objective of AIFMD, as specified by the European Commission, is to 
create a comprehensive and secure framework for the supervision and prudential oversight of AIFMs 
in the EU.21 More specifically, in response to the financial crisis, the directives objectives include but 
are not limited to enhancing investor protection by providing a common approach to protecting AIF 
investors and systemic risk oversight by improved monitoring of macro-prudential risks by competent 
authorities (CA). 22 
Although the directive’s scope is broader in the sense that the definition23, alternative investment fund 
(AIF), encompasses other investment funds than hedge funds, the primary target of the directive were 
hedge funds and to a lesser extent, private equity. For the AIF industry, the AIFMDs definition of its 
scope came as a surprise. Regulation originally designed to regulate hedge funds and private equity 
became applicable to all investment funds that did not qualify as UCITS under the Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITSD, 2009/65/EC).24 Thus AIFMD 
can be viewed as an attempt to bring whole shadow banking system under Union level regulation. 
 
1.2. Research purpose and structure of the study 
 
Granted, the regulatory content behind the terms AIF, AIFM and AIFMD includes provisions relating 
to multiple industry participants, the content of this research is chosen deliberately in the form which 
is most relevant to hedge fund industry. Thus, some of the provisions which affect hedge funds to 
lesser extend and other AIF’s in particular, are not discussed. As most of the European hedge funds 
                                                         
19 Why did AIFMD choose to regulate managers instead of the funds and the product? Great number of hedge funds are 
based in offshore tax havens and thus lie outside Europe’s jurisdiction, whilst the manager of funds is located in EU. 
Thus regulating the manager yields overall better regulatory response.  
20 AIMFD, Recital 2 
21 EC, Commission staff working document; Impact assessment accompanying the document commission delegated 
regulation supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regards to 
exemptions, general operating conditions, depositories, leverage, transparency and supervision, 2012 
22 For more details see Ch. 3.2.2 on AIFMD objectives 
23 AIFMD doesn’t define hedge funds, which is, prima facie, surprising. However in light of the concept of AIFMD it is 
quite logical. First it regulates the manager, not the fund, second it encompasses practically all funds which are not 
UCITS and fulfil the criteria. On this basis it’s clear a definition was neither useful nor necessary. Besides, there exists 
fundamental problem that it is practically impossible to provide exhaustive definition on hedge funds.  
24 Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012, pp. 1-19 
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are AIFMD compliant by now25, some impact assessment can be made, which is the ultimate purpose 
of the study. Thus, this research seeks to contribute to existing literature on AIFMD in a sense that 
there are very few, if any impact assessments made post-implementation. This might be result of the 
impacts being far-reaching and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the directive garnered significant attention 
ex-ante implementation, and some of these studies26 have indeed been taken into account with 
preparations of this thesis. However since then, it seems that the attention has somewhat waned.  
In order to provide a wider perspective on the subject, some context behind the motivations of the 
directive is initially examined. Thus, chapter two provides an overview of hedge funds and their 
regulation. The main characteristics of the industry are examined alongside discussion about the 
definitional issues relating to hedge funds. Afterwards, the reasoning behind the shift from indirect, 
i.e. industry self-regulation to direct regulation is provided. Two prominent pro-regulation themes 
emerge from this discussion, i.e. systemic risks and investor protection. They are discussed in further 
detail to provide context for chapter three, which proceeds to explain the (often political) motivations 
and objectives behind AIFMD.  
Thereafter the content of AIFMD is discussed in chapter four. In particular provisions on 
authorization, operating conditions, transparency requirements, leverage, and marketing are chosen 
under further scrutiny. This study takes a particularly pragmatic approach to the subject matter. 
Practical consequences of the provisions are included, which form the basis for the impact assessment 
in chapter five. The impact assessment is conducted by studying some of the latest industry surveys 
on the topic, alongside interpreting the content of the directive. It must be, however, acknowledged 
that there are some dispersion between the results of the surveys.27  
Finally, an analysis of the impacts of the directive is followed. The discussion is based on the content 
of chapter four and the results of the industry surveys. The focus is on four broad areas, namely the 
impact of the directive on funds by size, cross-border distribution, systemic risk and investor 
protection. This also concludes the theme since chapter two and three revolving around the systemic 
                                                         
25 Survey conducted by Preqin in June 2015 indicated that 82% of EU managers are AIFMD compliant and of which 
90% is in the UK. See Preqin, The 2015 Preqin Global Hedge Fund Report, July 2015 
26 For instance Charles River Associates, Impact of the Proposed AIFM directive across Europe, CRA Project No. 
D14806, 2009; Europe Economics, Ex-ante Evaluation of the proposed Alternative Investment Fund Directive, 2009; 
Open Europe, The EU’s AIFM Directive; Likely impact and best way forward, 2009; EC, supra at 21, 2012; Also Dirk 
A. Zetzsche (ed.), The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, Wolters Kluwer, Law & Business, 2012, 
which is not really an impact assessment, but is the most comprehensive overall evaluation on the directive to date. The 
work is extensively cited throughout the study. 
27 More on the constraints to the assesment See Ch. 5, 5.1 Methodology 
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risks and investor protection. Chapter six concludes, where also some de lege ferenda analysis is 
incorporated. 
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2. Overview of hedge funds and their regulation 
2.1. The definitional issue 
 
Alfred Winslow Jones is credited with pioneering the hedge fund movement in 1949 when he coupled 
the concepts of leveraging and short selling into an investment technique known as 
hedging.28  Although this did not eliminate risk, it did hedge the risk i.e. somewhat neutralize the 
effects of systematic risk29. However, the original meaning of the term “hedge fund" bears little 
resemblance to the hedge funds we have today. The variety of products which label themselves hedge 
funds is so diverse that the use of the term "hedge fund" is actually a misnomer.30 
The term "'hedge fund' is neither a legally defined term. The disagreement over a standard definition 
of hedge funds reflects the exponential growth in the number of products in existence.31 AIFMD, nor 
any other European directive directly defines “hedge funds”. 32 As notified by Dorsenfeir33, it’s clear 
that exhaustive definition for hedge funds is almost impossible to provide, and for instance for a piece 
of legislation such as AIFMD34 – could be even counterproductive. By nature, some hedge funds 
might not be covered by the definition creating regulatory loopholes. 35  However, if they can’t be 
broadly defined, then there must be a way of recognizing them. Thus, IOSCO36 for instance, has 
provided following characteristics for evaluating whether the company is a hedge fund: 
                                                         
28 The term hedge fund was introduced 1966 Fortune article by Loomis, Carol J. “The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With.” 
Fortune (April 1966). The article caused a brief surge in hedge fund investment, but despite generating decent returns 
Hedge funds didn’t gain prominence until the 1980s’. See T. Bullman,  Hedge Funds And The Definition Challenge 
Part 1, Mondaq, 2008 
29 Defined as the risk of overall market movements (caused for instance, by shift in global economic data) having 
impact on the price of an asset. 
30 Id; It’s a common misconception that hedge funds always “hedge” risk. Strictly speaking, hedging actually means the 
taking of two positions that offset risk so that regardless of the market events or market circumstances the risk bearer is 
left with a no win/no loss situation. Such hedging is often used by business’ to counter assumed effects from currency 
movements. Id. 
31 Francois-Serge Lhabitant, Handbook of Hedge Funds, Wiley Finance,2007, pp. 25 
32 Hedge funds reside in a category of investment known as alternative investments. This category also includes private 
equity, venture capital, real estate, oil & gas, timber, etc. 
33 Zetzsche, 2012, supra at 10, pp. 557-574 
34 The scope covers almost all hedge fund structures, without having to provide a laborious definition. See Ch. 4, 4.1 
AIFMD scope and definition. 
35 One frequently used definition is “any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organised, administered by 
professional investment managers, and not widely available to the public”. See Financial Stability Forum (FSF), Report 
of the Working Group on Highly Leveraged Institutions, 2000. However the definition is dated, as in some cases hedge 
funds are indeed available to public in the form of so called ‘Newcits’ i.e. hedge funds wrapped in UCITSD framework. 
More on Newcits see Steve Johnson, US hedge Funds move into ‘Newcits’, Financial Times, 2013; Filippo Stefanini et 
al., Investing in UCITS Compliant Hedge Funds, 2010 
36 IOSCO, Hedge Funds Oversight; Final Report 7 n, 2009 
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 Borrowing and leverage restrictions, which are typically included in collective investment 
schemes related regulation, are not applied, and many (but not all) hedge funds use high levels 
of leverage. 37 
 Derivatives38 are used, often for speculative purposes, and there is an ability to short sell 
securities. 39 
 More diverse risks or complex underlying products are involved.40 
 Significant performance fees41 (often in the form of a percentage of profits) are paid to the 
manager in addition to an annual management fee. 
 Investors are typically permitted to redeem their interests periodically, e.g., quarterly, semi-
annually or annually.42 
 Often significant ‘own ‘funds are invested by the manager.  
However, IOSCO Task Force also acknowledges that despite the broad characteristics described 
above, it is difficult to define hedge funds on a universal basis, given their different legal and business 
structures – not only across different jurisdictions but even within a single jurisdiction.43 As a result 
hedge funds are easier to recognize than to define as stated by UK Hedge Fund Working Group.44  
  
                                                         
37 However, with the introduction of AIFMD, leverage restrictions apply to hedge funds as well. Nevertheless, the 
leverage restrictions entailed by UCITSD are stricter. See Princeton Financial Systems, Leverage calculation for UCITS 
and AIF, 2014 
38  The range of derivatives available to hedge funds is much wider than what consist traditional put and call options 
available for typical mutual funds. These contain, for instance, OTC-derivatives such as swaps and various exotic 
options. 
39 Short selling allows hedge funds to profit from falling asset prices or hedge risk if the fund wishes to maintain long 
exposure. Selling stocks short is typically executed on margin. See Lhabitant, 2007, supra at 31. 
40 Hedge funds use variety of legal forms to optimize their taxation, such as offshore companies, which are typically 
unusual in the asset management industry.  
41 The typical industry standard is the 2/20 structure, i.e. 2% management fees and 20% fee on profits. This is notably 
different to mutual funds, which do not typically charge fees from profits. 
42 Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are not statutorily required to allow shareholders to redeem their shares daily, and 
their redemption frequency may vary from one month to several years. See FSF, supra at 35, 2000 
43 IOSCO, 2009, supra at 36. 
44 UK Hedge Fund Working Group, Hedge Fund Standards Consultation Paper - Part 1, p.33. 
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2.2. Hedge fund characteristics 
 
The following section evaluates hedge fund characteristics in further detail. Further examination of 
the characteristics is necessary, in order to provide context for the research on the impacts of the 
directive. 
 
2.2.1. Hedge fund strategies, performance, and compensation 
 
Although the term hedge fund is often used generically, it is essential to emphasize that hedge funds 
are not a homogenous group. As hedge funds have gained size and popularity, they have deviated 
from the original Alfred W. Jones’ model and are now following a plethora of investment strategies 
with different expected and realized risk and returns.45 Hedge funds strategies can be categorized in 
many ways, for instance by the instruments they trade, the location of markets, or whether fund trades 
on systematic or discretionary basis46.47 In any case, most hedge funds goal is to deliver absolute 
returns or alpha (risk-adjusted returns or the excess return of a hedge fund relative to a benchmark 
return). Thus, hedge funds aim to profit from market fluctuations whether it’s a rising or declining 
market.  
Some of the most popular hedge fund strategies are, global macro, long/short equities, relative-value, 
event driven and multi-strategies.48 Global macro funds tend to make leveraged directional 
investments in global currency, bonds, equities and commodity markets on a discretionary basis. 
Long/short equities is the most popular strategy; these funds typically maintain long and short 
exposure in equity and equity derivatives structures. Relative-value refers to the practice of taking 
offsetting positions in two related securities in the hopes that the price gap between the two securities 
                                                         
45 Lhabitant, supra at 31, pp.159-161 
46 With discretionary approach the strategy relies on the skill of the fund manager when making investment decisions, 
whilst with systematic approach the fund utilizes computer models for the majority of its trades. Both approaches are 
sometimes cited to describe the industry as whole (See Preqin, Discretionary vs Systematic: Two Contrasting Hedge 
Fund Approaches, 2014) and sometimes generally refer to managed futures trading (See Lhabitant, supra at 31, pp. 352-
354). 
47 See Gregory Connor and Teo Lasarte, An Introduction to Hedge Fund Strategies, 2003 
48 Some other popular strategies include distressed securities, dedicated short, convertible bond and fixed income 
arbitrage, managed futures, emerging markets, equity market neutral funds and activist funds. See Appendix 1 on 
breakdown of hedge fund strategies by popularity. 
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will move in a favourable direction. In some cases, there is an underlying reason49, why the favourable 
relative price changes are thought to be inevitable, while in other cases the trade is more purely 
speculative.50 Event driven51 funds build positions in anticipation of high impact events on company 
value such as corporate transactions and earnings announcements.  Many funds run multi-strategies, 
which may combine several investment policies. 52 
Hedge funds managers’ ability to perform well is based on information advantage. When strategies 
become public knowledge, they tend to stop working, in particular, arbitrage strategies. Thus more 
competition erodes profit opportunities, as it becomes difficult to attain information advantage. The 
gradual increase in the amount of hedge funds has steadily contributed to declining returns.53 While 
hedge funds used to outperform indices consistently pre-financial crisis and even during the crisis, 
along the past five years, they haven’t fared so well. During 2010-2014 hedge funds returned on 
average 7.71% compared to SP500 13.05%.54 Although hedge fund returns were delivered with lesser 
volatility, it must be noted that the returns would be higher without the relatively high fees the funds 
charge. 
As such, low returns, alongside high-performance fees have led to significant redemptions requests.55 
Many funds have altered the typical 2/20 fee structure and made it more flexible (in terms of adjusting 
the fees downwards), in case they are unable to deliver the promised returns. Indeed, particularly 
newly established funds tend to have much smaller management fees and performance fees in 
comparison to established funds.56 
 
                                                         
49 For instance short dated on-the-run treasury bonds often trade at premium, compared to the less liquid and longer 
dated off-the-run treasuries, as investors tend to price a premium for liquidity. Typically, a relative value arbitrageur 
might try to buy the off-the-run treasuries and short the on-the-run treasuries when the spread diverges significantly, 
due to temporary issues such as flight to quality, in anticipation of the spread to converge when the markets calm down. 
The risk is, that these ‘temporary’ issues might last longer than the arbitrageur stays solvent. 
50 Presidents working group, Report of The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, 
and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management, 1999, hereafter PWG 
51 An example of an event driven merger arbitrage strategy would be following. During mergers the stock prices 
typically do not trade at the agreed merger price, reflecting uncertainties with regards to the finalization of the merger. 
Merger arbitrage fund wound conduct its research and seek to exploit this price gap if it sees that the deal has very high 
probability to be executed. If the merger is finalized the hedge fund profits the spread from the deal.  
52 For detailed descriptions on hedge fund strategies and examples of trades see Lhabitant, supra at 31, 2007. See also 
Connor and Lasarte, supra at 47, 2003, who have grouped hedge funds strategies under four broad themes, namely 
long/short funds, event driven, tactical trading and relative value. 
53 There are many other reasons which have contributed to decline in returns; low return environment, technological 
advances and decline in retail order flow (i.e. professionals are betting against each other). 
54 Preqin, Preqin Global Hedge Fund Report, 2015 
55 Mary Childs and Lindsay Fortado, Investors pull $15bn from hedge funds, 2016, The Financial Times 
56 Madison Marriage, Hedge fund performance fees decline sharply, 2015, The Financial Times 
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2.2.2. Hedge fund structures and counterparties 
 
The principal actors in a hedge fund are (1) the hedge fund manager and investors (2) the fund itself 
(3) various network of service providers such as the fund administrator, the prime broker and the 
depositary.57 Contrary to mutual funds, which tend to be large integrated monolithic structures with a 
large number of staff, a typical hedge fund business is small, at least at the outset. Most hedge funds 
operate through a network of external service providers to which certain functions are delegated.58  
During the outset of the industry, hedge fund investors used to be mainly high net worth individuals, 
seeking for higher returns than traditionally are possible. However, nowadays the primary investors 
are institutions, such as pension funds, fund of funds59 and endowments. In relation, the hedge fund 
structure is often chosen in order to optimize taxation and particularly prevent double taxation of 
investors. The structure may also be chosen to facilitate investor investment in only one part of the 
hedge funds strategy, i.e. for instance funds bond strategy without carrying risk from equities or 
illiquid investments.  
Thus, the attraction of the different structures depends on both the residence and often, more 
importantly, the tax status of the investor.60 Hedge funds domiciled outside the United States are 
typically structured as offshore open-ended companies. Most offshore funds maintain their custody 
and administration in the offshore country, while hedge fund manager is located in the US or 
Europe.61 In general, the most common hedge fund structures are stand-alone funds, master-feeder 
funds and umbrella funds. However, hedge fund structures may vary decisively with regards the 
jurisdiction of the hedge fund, and typical offshore locations have come up with their various forms 
of hedge fund structures. 62  
The stand-alone fund is the quintessential fund structure, which practically consists of one fund, with 
one set of investors, making investments directly to the fund. Hedge fund manager might also create 
                                                         
57 EC, supra at 4 
58 Lhabitant, supra at 31. pp. 90.  
59 The definition of fund of fund is rather self-explanatory, they invest in number of hedge funds, mutual funds etc. 
They are also sometimes included in the general categorization for hedge fund strategies. They are generally considered 
an effective vehicle for risk diversification, however the layering of fees (the hedge fund charges a fee from the fund of 
fund, and the fund of fund charges a fee from investors) is often considered a drawback.  
60 Not only are offshore hedge fund structures necessary for targeting offshore clients, but in the United States for 
instance, they appeal in particular to US tax-exempt investors who wish to avoid unrelated business income tax (UBIT). 
See http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/educational-articles/in-depth-articles/starting-a-hedge-fund.html  
61 Lhabitant, 2007, supra at 31, pp 85. 
62 For instance Jersey has long list of fund types such as Recognized funds, Unclassified funds, Listed Funds, Expert 
Funds, Private placement funds etc. Conversely Cayman Islands have exempted funds, licensed funds, administrated 
funds etc. For more details See Gordon Casey, The Cayman Edge: How to Set up a Cayman Fund, 2015 
11 
 
several stand-alone funds to accommodate different strategies (mirror funds), although more often 
than not the more advantageous way is to create a master-feeder structure. Master-feeder is probably 
most common structure after the stand-alone fund and is typically employed by the larger funds. In 
practice master-feeder fund consists of offshore and onshore fund, and each of these funds are 
available for those investors for whom the specific fund makes the most sense from a tax and 
regulatory standpoint.63 These funds subsequently invest all their money in the master fund, which 
then makes investments in accordance with the strategy. Umbrella fund is a fund which operates 
multiple strategies under one fund. Investors into umbrella fund might, for example, subscribe for 
class A shares, knowing that A shares will only participate in investments into bonds.64 Thus, these 
investors wouldn’t be exposed risk related to class B shares which might trade equities and bonds 
alike. 65 
A hedge fund can be either closed-ended or open-ended.66 However, the distinction between an open-
end and a closed-end hedge fund is not as black-and-white as it is in the mutual-fund sector. Virtually 
all hedge funds allow their investors to liquidate their positions at some horizon; in this sense, they 
are all quasi-open-ended. At the same time, most hedge funds put some restrictions on withdrawals, 
and thus do not represent as pure case as open-end mutual funds.67 Hedge funds may employ a 
quarterly or annual redemption constraint, exercise gating68 provisions or engage in side pocketing69 
agreements with their investors.  
Lastly, the hedge fund business model depends vastly on its service provider network.70 Operating 
through service providers allows smaller number of personnel to access a wider skill base. In return 
                                                         
63 Sean Dailey, Is it time to revisit your hedge fund structure?, Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 2013 
64 Naturally the fund structure needs to be organized so that the investor doesn’t carry risk from Class B shares, which 
might invest to equities for instance. This is done by segregated portfolio companies (in Cayman Islands, for instance), 
which allows separate investments, while protecting each class or portfolio, from the liabilities of the other portfolios 
within the fund. See Casey, supra at 62, 2015; Ogier, Segregated Portfolio Companies in the Cayman Islands, 2011 
65 On more details on operational and organizational structures of hedge funds see Lhabitant, 2007, supra at 31. pp. 85-
119 
66 Closed-ended hedge fund is a fund with shares that are not redeemable, and will usually close and return funds to the 
investors, together with the return on their investment, after an agreed period of time. The funds may also allow trading 
of the fund’s shares depending on its policies. Pure open-ended funds shares are redeemable at any time.  
67 Jeremy C. Stein, Why Are Most Funds Open-End? Competition and the Limits of Arbitrage, Harvard University and 
NBER, 2003 
68 Hedge funds may lock-up shares i.e. limit the maximum percentage of the funds overall capital that can be withdrawn 
on a scheduled redemption date. Gating provisions are typically exercised during market turmoil, or when a hedge fund 
is in a sudden drawdown to prevent run on the fund.  
69 Side pocket is a type of account used in hedge funds to separate illiquid assets from other more liquid 
investments. This allows wider investment on illiquid assets and acts as cushion when investors demand redemptions; 
they might be able to receive redemptions from the liquid investments but the side pocket investment remains until it’s 
liquidated. 
70 See Appendix 2: Typical hedge fund service provider network. 
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service providers receive specified fee from the fund pursuant to various agreements.71 The most 
important service providers are the fund administrator, the prime broker and depositary.  The primary 
role of the administrator of the fund is to provide back-office support, by taking responsibility for the 
operations, administrative, accounting and valuation services. However the level and scope of work 
involved varies substantially depending on the type of hedge funds covered, their sophistication and 
the activities already covered by the prime broker.72 
The prime brokerage service includes the following services; clearance and recordkeeping; providing 
intraday credit to facilitate foreign exchange payments and securities transactions; providing margin 
credit to finance purchases of equity securities; and borrowing securities from investment fund 
managers on behalf of hedge funds to support the hedge funds’ equity short positions, thus allowing 
investment funds to avoid direct exposure to hedge funds. 73 They may also provide the hedge fund 
with various levels of other services, such as research and capital introduction. Pre-AIFMD, 
particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world, hedge funds typically centralized their custodial with the 
prime broker. However, AIFMD separates the prime brokerage and custodial services and requires 
all hedge funds to appoint a depositary who’s in charge, inter alia, of custodial services and 
supervision of the fund.74 
 
2.2.3. Hedge fund domiciliation 
 
As previously mentioned, hedge funds are primarily managed from an onshore location, whilst the 
fund is typically established in an offshore location.75 The main advantage to setting up offshore is 
tax neutrality; the idea is that investors don’t get inappropriately saddled with the fund’s tax burden. 
Thus, the Cayman Islands is the largest hedge fund jurisdiction for the fund itself and fund 
administration, as significant tax and regulatory advantages exist for hedge fund domiciled in 
Cayman.76 Other popular locations are the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda. They attract both UK 
and US funds, as the countries benefit from historical ties to the UK and geographical proximity to 
the US.77 
                                                         
71 Lhabitant, supra at 31, pp. 90 
72 Id. 
73 PWG, supra at 50, 1999  
74 AIFMD, Article 21, 1 
75 See Appendix 3: Hedge fund domiciliation by AUM 
76 See Fund Associates, White paper Offshore Hedge Funds Vs. Onshore Hedge Funds, 2008 
77 TheCityUK, Hedge Funds Report, 2013; D. Clarkson et al., Domiciles of alternative investment funds, Oliver 
Wyman, 2014 
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The US is the largest centre for hedge funds, managing close to 70% of global assets at the end of 
2012, down from 83% a decade earlier. Europe followed with 21% and Asia with most of the 
remainder. TheCityUK estimates that around 42% of global hedge fund assets were managed from 
New York, down from over a half a decade earlier. London remains by far the largest centre for hedge 
funds in Europe. Around 600 funds located in the UK managed some 85% of European-based hedge 
funds’ assets. The largest seven hedge funds in Europe were all headquartered in London in 2012.  78 
In addition, Ireland and Luxembourg are particularly popular jurisdictions for hedge fund 
administration and registration in Europe. For instance, around 40% of global hedge funds are 
estimated to be partly administered in Ireland.79  
 
2.3. Benefits and adverse effects of hedge funds to financial markets 
 
During regular market conditions, hedge funds provide significant benefits for financial markets. 
They facilitate risk distribution, provide liquidity and contribute to efficient pricing of securities and 
thus to further global integration of markets.  However when markets are distressed, hedge funds 
interconnectedness to their counterparties and their market behaviour may magnify the turmoil. 
Hedge funds provide a platform for substantial risk diversification for investors. Including hedge 
funds in portfolios of traditional assets, such as stocks and fixed income, has historically lead to a 
better risk-return trade-off80, as hedge funds strive to generate returns regardless of adverse market 
conditions and thus are often uncorrelated to the broader market.81  
Hedge funds often trade actively and employ a wide spectrum of different strategies. These trading 
activities contribute to the efficient functioning of financial markets by deepening market liquidity 
and enhancing the price discovery process.82 They trade a multitude of instruments such as OTC-
derivatives, creating markets for supply and demand to meet in otherwise illiquid markets. Benefits 
from added liquidity are realized as lower transaction costs, namely by tightening of the bid-ask 
spreads.  
                                                         
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Theoretically, the efficient frontier, as in Harry Markowitz’ Nobel Prize winning modern portfolio theory, shifts to 
the up and left. See Appendix 4: Efficient frontier Analysis with hypothetical hedge fund allocation. 
81 However it must be acknowledged that the correlation to broader market indices is heavily dependent of hedge funds 
strategy in question. During the financial crisis, in aggregate, many hedge funds were heavily correlated to global stock 
markets thus the diversification benefits remained limited in some cases. 
82 EC, supra at 4 
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As hedge funds constantly seek for new profit opportunities – by often taking contrarian positions – 
they help to correct prices of over/undervalued securities and allocate capital on locations where it's 
most efficiently used. The mechanisms used to lock up capital in hedge funds (such as gates83 and 
side-pocket arrangements) enable them to sustain their contrarian positions further. Such a function 
can potentially smooth market volatility and reduce the number and magnitude of asset price bubbles. 
Partly because of all these benefits, some argue that markets have become more resilient in times of 
distress since the emergence of hedge funds as major market participants.84 
Despite their widely acknowledged benefits, hedge funds can pose risks to the financial system. 
Although their role in causing financial instability is highly contested, some consider that hedge 
funds’ size and leverage, their interconnectedness with banks and prime brokers and the likelihood 
of herding may increase systemic risks.85  
Furthermore, in certain circumstances, their trading activities may be destabilising. These actions, 
instead of stamping unfair valuations, might lead to significant market panics.86  However, it is very 
difficult to draw the line between seemingly manipulative trades and rational economic behaviour.87 
Yet during the financial crisis, there were fears that the hedge fund short-selling could drive the stock 
price of systemically relevant financial institutions to exaggeratedly low levels and thereby 
undermine their viability, which prompted the introduction of temporary curbs on the practice in 
many jurisdictions around the world.88 
 
 
                                                         
83 Gating can be very beneficial at times of distress, as a measure preventing unnecessary deleveraging stemming from 
panicking investors’ redemption requests.  
84 As noted by Nabilou and Pacces, the severity of the recent financial crisis and the collapse of several hedge funds 
during the crisis shed substantial doubts on these claims. See H. Nabilou and M. Pacces, 2015 supra at 11; also Lloyd 
Dixon et al., Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, 2012, pp. 47–49. 
85 Id. 
86 During the Asian financial crisis, macro funds sold Asian currencies such as Thailand baht short. These bear raids 
may have contributed to the crisis, although generally studies have concluded that hedge funds were not the culprits of 
the crisis. Hedge funds were not the only market participants shorting the Asian currencies. Banks proprietary desks 
tended to mimic the same behaviour. Similar events occurred during the European Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis 
(ERM), when hedge funds piled on shorting the likes of British pound, in anticipation of the breakup of the mechanism. 
See Lhabitant, 2007, supra at 31, pp. 327-346  
87 Counterargument to latter could be that the Asian economies were already fundamentally vulnerable, and thus hedge 
funds helped the markets to create the necessary adjustment. In similar vein, many commentators consider that the ERM 
was a economic failure. Thus one might argue, such adjustments would and should occur, were there hedge funds or 
not. See Evan Davis, Lessons learned on Black Wednesday, BBC News, 2002; Barry Eichengreen and Donald 
Mathieson (with B. Chadha, A. Jansen, L. Kodres, and S. Sharma), Hedge Funds and Financial Market Dynamics, 
IMF, 1999 
88 Nabilou and M. Pacces, 2015 supra at 11. 
15 
 
2.4. Hedge fund regulation 
 
The main objectives of financial regulation are often considered to be investor (customer) protection, 
ensuring market integrity and mitigating systemic risks.89 Thus, in this chapter their relation with 
hedge funds is discussed. The topics are examined individually, although they do overlap in certain 
cases. For instance, issues associated with transparency may relate to both systemic risks and investor 
protection. Lastly, at the end of the chapter, brief discussion on the possible regulatory approaches is 
provided. 
2.4.1. Systemic risk  
 
Systemic risk90 may be transmitted through two major channels as distinguished by the ECB91; the 
market and the credit channel. Market channel relates to trading activities of hedge funds in the capital 
markets. Risks may be transmitted through market channel due to hedge fund herding, forced 
deleveraging or short selling into already collapsing markets. The credit channel relates to the fact 
that hedge funds are often counterparties in trades or as lenders of banks. A failure of large hedge 
fund could create systemic impact if the lenders of that hedge fund were unable to recover their loans 
from the hedge fund and were themselves systemically important institutions.92  
Nevertheless, hedge funds have not traditionally been considered of particular systemic relevance. 
Studies have concluded that hedge funds trading activities did not cause the Asian financial crisis, 
nor did they seemingly contribute to systemic risk build-up during it.93 The failure of LTCM (and 
other famous failures such as Amaranth) were also absorbed by the financial system without long-
                                                         
89 See Ana Maria Fagetan, Regulation of hedge funds in the US, the UK and the EU, Queen Mary University London, 
2012; Rene M Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past, Present, Future, 2007; Jon Danıelsson, Ashley Taylor and Jean–Pierre 
Zigrand; Highwaymen or Heroes: Should Hedge Funds be Regulated?, London School of Economics, 2004 
90 For the purposes of this study systemic events and systemic risks are defined followingly; Systemic event refers to the 
release of bad news about a financial institution, or even its failure, or the crash of financial markets, which leads in a 
sequential fashion to considerable adverse effects on one or several other financial institutions or markets, e.g. their 
failure or crash. Systemic risk can therefore be defined as the risk of systemic event occurring, that affects a 
considerable number of financial institutions or markets, thereby severely impairing the general well-functioning (of an 
important part) of the financial system. However, it’s important to distinguish that systemic risks and events can have 
different meanings and connotations in separate circumstances. For detailed high-level definitions on systemic events 
and risks see Oliver De Bandt and Philip Hartmann, Systemic Risk, European Central Bank Working Paper No. 35, 
2000  
91 ECB, “Hedge funds and their implications for financial stability”, Occasional paper series No. 34, 2005, pp. 28. 
92  In order to mitigate this risk, most lending from credit institutions to hedge funds is conducted on a collateralised 
basis (i.e. the broker is given assets of the hedge fund as security against the loan advanced). Nonetheless, it can be 
difficult for credit institutions to recoup their money when a collapse is so complete that the value of the collateral is 
impaired. See Charles River Associates, Impact of the Proposed AIFM directive across Europe, CRA Project No. 
D14806, 2009 
93 For detailed accounts on the crisis see Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Working Group on Highly Leveraged 
Institutions, FSF, 2000 and Eichengreen et al., supra at 87, 1998 
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term market disruption.94 However, the financial crisis led to re-assessment of this viewpoint, and it 
was widely recognized that hedge funds market behaviour and size may have systemic implications. 
Thus, the financial crisis forms logical base for assessing whether hedge funds transmit systemic risk. 
The failure of LTCM also acts as an excellent, yet isolated example of risks associated with the 
combination of leverage, position concentration, and lack of regulatory oversight and risk 
management, which could have led to system-wide contagion from a single hedge fund. Some of 
these issues were highlighted during the financial crisis as well.  
Long-Term Capital Management 
The collapse of LTCM precipitated the first in-depth assessment by policymakers95 on the potential 
systemic risks posed by hedge fund industry. LTCM was bailed out of nearly $5 billion of losses 
made as a result of the Russian default and subsequent devaluation of the rouble in late 1998. LTCM 
evidenced the ability of a single hedge fund to affect an entire economy's financial stability.96 
LTCM had an impressive track record over the period of 1994-1997 net of fees, of approximately 40 
percent in 1995 and 1996, and slightly less than 20 percent in 1997, which was achieved with low 
levels of volatility. LTCM sought to profit from a variety of trading strategies, focusing in particular 
on fixed income spread trades, such as relative value and convergence trades.97 Due to its spectacular 
returns, the funds’ capital had grown from 1.25 billion to 7.3 billion by 1997, and its assets to 120 
billion implying 16:1 leverage.98 
However, by 1997 the standard spread bets of LTCM had become overcrowded. Thus it became 
increasingly difficult for LTCM to maintain such high performance with its soaring capital. 
Consequently the funds principals decided to branch away from its trademark strategies and venture 
into new areas such as taking directional equity trades in various markets. They also returned 2.7 
billion of equity capital to investors, but maintained the size of the funds positions which led to 
tremendous increase in leverage.  Using the January 1, 1998, equity capital figure of $4.8 billion, this 
                                                         
94 Unlike LTCM, that was rescued and subsequently wound down, Amaranth Advisors actually collapsed after it lost 
$6.5 billion in September 2006 on wrong-way bets on natural gas prices. See Bullman, supra at 28, 2008 
95 Much of the part is based on the Presidents Working Group report on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and 
the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management. PWG, Supra at 50. 1999. 
96 Bullman, supra at 28, 2008 
97 The spread convergence arbitrage, was nearly a true form of arbitrage as the profits were almost risk free. The 
hindrance was that, the strategy needed to accommodate massive amounts of leverage as the misalignments in prices 
were small. In addition once other participants realized the chance for risk free profits, such inefficiencies tended to 
disappear. Thus, LTCM also used different relative value strategies, where it was practically speculating that spreads 
return to historical averages, for instance between emerging markets and developed markets fixed income securities, 
which entailed a much larger risk.  
98 PWG, supra at 50, 1999.  
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level of assets implied a balance-sheet leverage ratio of more than 25:1. LTCM had also engaged in 
various off-balance sheet transactions in derivatives, to total a notional amount of more than a trillion 
dollars. In total the fund had more than 60 000 trades in its books and leverage to 500:1.99100  
The LTCM Fund’s size and leverage, as well as the trading strategies that it utilized, made it 
vulnerable to the extraordinary financial market conditions that emerged following Russia’s 
devaluation of the rouble and the default of Russia’s government on August 17 1998. Russia’s actions 
sparked a flight to quality101 in which investors avoided risk and sought out liquidity. As a result, risk 
spreads and liquidity premiums rose sharply in markets around the world (LTCM had earlier deemed 
that quality liquid investments were overpriced in comparison, to lower quality investments, and that 
the spread between them should narrow). The pervasiveness of the widening of risk spreads 
confounded the risk management models employed by LTCM and other participants. Both LTCM 
and other market participants suffered losses in individual markets that greatly exceeded what 
conventional risk models, estimated during more stable periods, suggested were probable. Eventually, 
LTCM was bailed out by the consortium, which consisted major creditors organized by the Federal 
Reserve (Fed). This was arguably102 the right thing to do given the possible system-wide 
repercussions what an uncontrolled collapse of the fund could have caused. 103  
Default by the fund could have created significant systemic risks, as the counterparties would have 
had to quickly move to limit their exposures. These risk-limiting moves may have required the 
liquidation or replacement of positions and collateral in the many markets where the LTCM held 
sizable positions at depressed prices. LTCM itself estimated that its top 17 counterparties would have 
suffered various substantial losses — potentially between $3 billion and $5 billion in aggregate — 
and shared this information with the fourteen firms participating in the consortium. The firms in the 
consortium saw that their losses could be serious, with potential losses to some firms amounting to 
$300 million to $500 million each.104  
                                                         
99 Lhabitant, supra at 31, 2007, pp. 155-160 
100 PWG, 1999, supra at 50. 
101 Flight to quality occurs when investors shift their allocations from risky assets to less riskier assets, such as from 
stocks to bonds or even cash. 
102 Initially Warren Buffet along with Goldman Sachs and American International Group offered to buy off LTCM for 
250 million and inject 3.75 billion in to the fund. However, LTCM’s principals declined the offer. Four days after 14 
banks led by the Fed offered to buy 90% of LTCM for 3.65 billion – a much better valuation for the existing partners. 
This caused many authoritatively sources, such as ex-Fed Chairman Paul Volcker to highlight the issues with regards to 
moral hazard. It is, however. possible to argue also that market solution was found. In the end the consortium recovered 
its money with modest profit and according to the Fed, no taxpayer money was actually used. See Lhabitant, supra at 
30, pp. 155-160; John Authers, The Short View; Moral Hazard, 2008, The Financial Times; David Shirref, Lessons 
From the Collapse of Hedge Fund, Long-Term Capital Management, Berkeley, 2009 
103 PWG, 1999, supra at 50. 
104 Id. 
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There were multiple reasons which lead to the collapse of the fund. The information LTCM disclosed 
to its counterparties was not nearly adequate considering the complexity of its operations. For instance 
information such as balance sheet and income statements did not reveal meaningful details about the 
fund’s risk profile and concentration of exposures in certain markets.  The minimal level of disclosure 
was tolerated because of the stature of its principals105, its impressive track record, and the opportunity 
for the fund’s investors and counterparties to profit from a significant relationship with LTCM. 106  
There was also a profound problem with LTCM’s risk management. Some sources argue that LTCM 
relied too much on theoretical market-risk models and not enough on stress-testing, gap risk, and 
liquidity risk. 107 Furthermore, the over-reliance on Value at Risk (VaR), which rely on historical data 
has been cited as one of the key reasons for its collapse.108 Others claim LTCM had in fact done 
that.109 Looking back on LTCM’s history, Eric Rosenfeld, one of the founders of LTCM, considers 
the failure to anticipate trader-driven correlation to be the fund’s central error.110 There was an 
assumption that the portfolio was sufficiently diversified across world markets to produce low 
correlation, but as previously mentioned, LTCM was replicating practically same credit spread trade 
in most of the markets it was trading. In August and September 1998 credit spreads widened in 
practically every market at the same time, causing LTCM’s positions to collapse in value. If LTCM 
had foreseen this possibility, its risk calculations would have come out differently111. 
Global Financial Crisis 
Charles River Associates (CRA), among others112, investigated whether hedge funds were a source 
of systemic risk during the financial crisis. Their notable conclusion was that hedge funds transmitted 
systemic risk through deleveraging i.e. through the market channel. However, they also concluded 
that regarding credit channel the systemic repercussions remained minimal.113  
                                                         
105 LTCMs founders included Myron S. Scholes and Robert C. Merton who were both Nobel Prize winners. Scholes 
also coined the famous Black and Scholes option pricing model with Fischer Black. 
106 Id. 
107 Interestingly, despite of LTCM’s overreliance on VaR, and its acknowledged shortcomings, it still remained one of 
the main models for risk calculations before financial crisis. In the financial crisis aftermath it was acknowledged that 
VaR by itself its insufficient metric and should be supplemented with other metrics. 
108 Shirref, supra at 102, 2009 
109 Sebastian Mallaby, More Money Than God; Hedge Funds and the Making of a New Elite, 2010, pp. 230 
110 Id, pp. 237. 
111 Id.  
112 See The High-level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU Report, supra at 6, 2009; The Turner Review, A 
regulatory response to the global banking crisis, FSA, 2009 
113 CRA, supra at  92, 2009 
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The limited impact on credit channel can be attributed to the fact that lending by prime brokers to 
hedge funds is/was subject to prudential rules. 114115 There were 1500 hedge fund failures during 
2008116, yet the systemic repercussions remained limited. Neither did the collapses of larger funds 
cause substantial risk transmission. CRA examined the most notable failures, such as the failure of 
Peloton ABS Master Fund, Carlyle Capital Corporation and Bearn Stearns Asset Management 
(BSAM). They concluded that only the collapse of BSAM hedge funds appeared to have had more 
significant implications on the financial system.117  
According to CRA, there were two important points to be made regarding BSAM. The BSAM funds 
were distinctive because they were associated with a systemically important bank whereas the 
majority of hedge fund managers are stand-alone firms which are not owned by a systemically 
important bank. The problem might then be thought of as poor investment management and decision 
making by Bear Stearns, which contributed to a loss of confidence in the bank that later forced its 
sale (to JP Morgan in March 2008). This is rather different from a credit channel problem. For the 
hedge industry as whole, CRA also suggests that while hedge funds had to deleverage during the 
autumn of 2008, the industry overall managed to do so without damaging its bank counterparties (in 
the sense that debt was paid back on demand without significant loss to lenders).118 
With regards to the market channel, there were problems with hedge funds already during the onset 
of financial crisis. During the “quant quake” in August of 2007, a number of highly successful and 
leveraged quantitative long/short equity market neutral funds lost between 5 to 30% in a single day 
due to deleveraging led by their models. Apparently, there were no other fundamental reasons to 
deleverage except that once the models of these funds recognized few large funds were deleveraging, 
a fire sale was triggered to meet margin calls and to reduce risk. This prompted commentary that 
systemic risk from hedge funds had increased, partly from leverage and partly for the simple reason 
that funds might deleverage simply due to positioning.119120 
                                                         
114 After the collapse of LTCM, most prime brokers had also required full collateralization of hedge fund transactions. 
See Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge fund regulation via Basel III, Vanderbilt journal of transnational law, 44:389, 2011 
115 It was also recognized by the EC, that this indirect approach to the regulation of hedge fund activity appears to have 
been effective in mitigating risks to the banking system. See EC, supra at 4 
116 Mallaby, supra at 109, 2010 
117 CRA, supra at 92, 2009 
118 Id; this conclusion was also backed up by the High-level Group on Financial Supervision and the Turner Review.  
119 For comprehensive overview on the “Quant quake” see Amir E. Khandani and Andrew W. Lo, What happened to the 
quants in August 2007?, MIT, 2007 
120 On a separate note, Lo emphasises that the events of August 2007 are not particularly relevant about the efficacy of 
quantitative investing as the losses were more likely the result of a fire sale liquidation of quantitatively constructed 
portfolios rather than the specific shortcomings of quantitative methods. See Andrew W. Lo, Hedge funds, Systemic 
Risk and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, Written Testimony of Andrew W. Lo, Prepared for the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2008 
20 
 
The risks to the market channel were yet again demonstrated after the financial crisis ignited. As the 
markets suddenly started falling, hedge funds collateral deteriorated and borrowing ratios were 
breached. This lead to margin calls and forced deleveraging. As a consequence, hedge funds faced 
significant redemption requests from investors, which contributed to the domino effect as they were 
forced to sell their positions further.121 There were also some hedge funds short selling122 to already 
falling markets, while others found exotic123 ways to bet against the collapse of the economy.  All in 
all, as noted by EC, ‘this pro-cyclical behaviour’ may have undermined financial stability and 
contributed to a deepening of the crisis.124 Thus, as also concluded by CRA; “the extent of this selling 
does appear to have been sufficiently non-trivial to have contributed to a vicious circle of declining 
prices and for this selling to have had an impact on overall financial markets.”125 The substantial 
decline in gross assets of hedge funds indeed suggests that deleveraging created systemic risks.126 
 
2.4.2. Investor protection 
 
Before the financial crisis, the consensus was that hedge funds investors do not need extra protection, 
and the market works fine on the basis of caveat emptor. This was due to the belief that investors in 
hedge funds are high net worth individuals or institutional investors who are sophisticated enough to 
conduct their due diligence on the hedge funds. Moreover, in the view of the influential Financial 
Stability Forum, direct regulation could have favoured a form of moral hazard inducing investors and 
counterparties to reduce their normal due diligence and relax their risk management standards.127 Yet 
it was widely known that some industry practices such as lack of disclosure, and lack of independence 
                                                         
121 This lead to imposition of gates and suspensions. EC, supra at 4.  
122 Which was one of the reasons of short selling curbs across the globe. 
123 The credit default swap (CDS) market practically ballooned slightly before financial crisis, as hedge funds were 
looking for a leveraged way to bet on the collapse of housing markets. John Paulson, a hedge fund manager, reportedly 
made over 14 billion on betting against the US subprime mortgage market via CDS’s. Gregory Zuckerman, Profiting 
From the Crash, The Wall Street Journal, 2009 
124 EC, supra at 4. 
125 CRA, supra at 92, 2009; Similar conclusions were made by the High Level Group on Financial Supervision and in 
the Turner Review. 
126 See Appendix 5; Leverage position in the hedge fund industry from 2000 to 2008, which demonstrates that the gross 
assets of hedge funds declined significantly more than the net assets. 
127 The Financial Stability Forum, Recommendations and Concerns Raised by Highly Leveraged Institutions: An 
Assessment, FSF, 2002 
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of funds valuator may lead to fraudulent activity and conflict of interests. In addition, the increasing 
retailization128 caused concerns to regulators.129  
The financial crisis brought to light shortcomings with investor protection in an unprecendented scale 
and acted also as a catalyst for more regulation.130 The lack of transparency and disclosure exposed 
investors to larger than expected losses.131 Investors were often hurt by hedge funds excercising their 
rights to deny redemptions by gates and lock-ups. In addition, valuation of illiquid assets may have 
favoured hedge funds managers in some cases, in a sense that some funds were slow to adjust the 
value of their assets down. And lastly, the Bernard Madoff’s grand scale Ponzi scheme lead to 
unprecedented losses, and highlighted the issues with lack of separation in custodial services.132     
Lack of transparency; fraud, valuation, and conflict of interests 
There were many notable fraud cases with hedge funds long before Madoff, albeit not in a similar 
scale. During 2000-2005, there were over 52 fraud cases, with only five cases133 accounting for 1.5 
billion of lost capital.134 Most common types of fraud are an overstatement of performance, payment 
of excessive and undisclosed commissions, and misappropriation of client money.135 Many of the 
fraud cases could have been avoided with stricter disclosure standards and separation of custodial 
services.  
In addition valuation has been a particularly problematic topic before the financial crisis and during 
it.136 Despite the importance of accurately valuing the assets in a hedge fund's portfolio, no uniform 
                                                         
128 Meaning the increasing availability of hedge fund products and how and to whom they are available. See William H. 
Donaldson, Testimony Concerning Investor Protection Implications of Hedge Funds, Chairman, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 2003 
129 See Id.  
130 “Given the asymmetry of information and power between investor and hedge fund, the pre-crisis argument that 
investor due diligence is enough has worn out “. See IOSCO, 2009, supra at 33. 
131 IOSCO, 2009, supra at 36 
132 It’s also notable, with the benefit of hindsight, that it was quite clear that many Madoff investors conducted 
extremely relaxed due diligence - despite some of the red flags being known, they chose to ignore them. See Dirk A. 
Zetzsche  ed. 2012, pp. 409-445; Erin E. Arvedlund, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Bernie Madoff Attracts Sceptics in 2001, 
Barron’s, 2001; G. Gregoriou & F. Lhabitant supra at 16, 2009 
133 See Appendix 6: Selected hedge fund disasters and losses 
134 Majed R. Muhtaseb and Chun Chun Yang  "Portraits of five hedge fund fraud cases", Journal of Financial Crime, 
2008, pp. 179 – 213;  
135 For instance David Mobley, founder Maricopa International Investments administered a Ponzi scheme and 
conducted over 59 million offence. He sent investors false statements and monthly performance figures, while 
misappropriating investor money for his own use. See Gina Edwards, Mobley: Investors still reeling from shock of fraud 
allegations, Naples Daily News, 2000. From 1996 through 2005, Samuel Israel and Daniel Marino misappropriated, 
dissipated and lost tens of millions of dollars of their clients’ money that was invested in the Bayou Fund, and its 
successors. Investors deposited more than $450 million into the Funds over the course of their existence. See SEC,  
SEC CHARGES SAMUEL ISRAEL III, DANIEL E. MARINO, BAYOU MANAGEMENT, AND BAYOU FUNDS 
FOR DEFRAUDING HEDGE FUND INVESTORS AND MISAPPROPRIATING INVESTOR ASSETS, 2005 
136 Most enforcement actions instituted by the SEC against hedge funds from 1999-2004 involved a valuation problem. 
Typical case on valuation related fraud would be Springer Asset Management, which misrepresented the performance 
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standards existed before the financial crisis.137  The fundamental problem with valuation is the attempt 
to provide a single number to determine what an illiquid or derivative asset is worth.138 Thus there is 
a risk, that when a hedge fund manager values the assets in its fund according to a model that it 
developed, that the performance fee is, in part, determined by a model that overvalues the fund's 
assets.139  
The fact that valuations are often conducted by independent administrators may have served to 
alleviate this risk. However, an independent administrator is usually paid by the hedge fund manager 
and may not understand all of the positions and strategies employed by the manager. Thus, the 
manager may remain the person in charge of valuation even though formally that position has been 
externalized, causing significant conflict of interests.140  
There are also a number of other conflict of interests. For example, a conflict may arise if the hedge 
fund manager utilizes fund assets to pay for prime brokerage services such as capital introduction and 
marketing that benefit the fund manager as compared to the investors.  In addition, in some cases, 
side latter141 agreements are not disclosed promptly.142 Also, managers may be incentivised to have 
higher leverage to capital ratios than optimal for the fund as this could increase the likelihood for 
them to make their performance fees. This could lead to market instability as investors are badly 
informed, and managers take riskier positions to increase potential returns.143  
Retailization 
                                                         
of its Apollo Fund, by overvaluing privately held internet security called Citi411.com, which also constituted 70% of 
the fund’s holdings. The fund even increased the valuation of Citi411.com during 2000-2002, from 1$ a share to 5.5$ a 
share, despite the crash in similar publicly traded internet stocks. See Lhabitant, supra at 31, 2007 pp 52-53. 
137 Ryan Sklar, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge Fund Managers’ Conflict of Interests, Fordham 
Law Review, 2009; The Financial Stability Forum had previously called on the hedge fund industry to deliver 
improvements with respect valuation techniques and IOSCO had also released its principles for valuation. See IOSCO, 
Principles for the Valuation of Hedge Fund Portfolios, 2007 
138 Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, 2009 
139 Sklar, supra at 139, 2009. 
140 Kaal, supra at 140, 2009 
141 At times hedge fund managers give preferential treatment to certain fund investors, typically those who they want to 
invest in any new hedge funds the manager may be opening. By entering into a "side letter" agreement, a hedge fund 
manager can agree to provide a favoured investor with specified preferences that are not available to all the hedge fund's 
investors.  Preferential treatment may take the form of superior investment opportunities and more favourable 
redemption terms. Although side letters can help hedge fund managers attract large investors to the fund-thereby 
benefiting all the fund's investors-they also have the propensity to work disadvantages on those investors not receiving 
preferential treatment. Sklar, supra at 139, 2009 
142IOSCO, supra at 36, 2009 
143 Id; Investment in their own funds by managers may however help to mitigate some of the conflicts of interest as it 
can align the interest of the manager with the investor. 
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Although not considered a major issue in Europe144, retailization is in particular a problem in the US. 
This is due to increased number of US residents qualifying as accredited investors, thus often de-facto 
unsophisticated investors may invest in hedge funds. Retail investors are also sometimes indirectly 
involved with hedge funds, without to their knowledge.145146 As highlighted by Edwards; “most of 
the complexities related to hedge funds such as – information asymmetries, potential conflicts of 
interest and disparate investor capabilities – are well-understood by many investors, but are clearly 
not understood by all retail investors”.147  Therefore there may be a case for regulatory intervention 
if such investors start investing in hedge funds en masse. 
 
2.4.3. Regulatory approach 
 
In principle, there are two ways of regulating hedge funds, indirect or direct regulation. This approach 
can be further divided into regulating fund only, regulating manager only, regulating both fund and 
manager, regulating the investors or regulating the counterparties approach. However, the regulatory 
approach comes down fundamentally always, whether hedge funds should be regulated directly or 
indirectly.148  
Direct regulation mainly relies on the threat of law by using command-and-control149 regulatory 
instruments.150 Conversely, with indirect regulation, securities regulators refrain from directly 
exercising their regulatory power or authority. Thus the regulators wait to see what the relevant 
market players do in the marketplace, encouraging them to regulate themselves by relying on best 
practices or guidelines for the funds, fund managers, and their counterparties, made and released by 
                                                         
144 AIFMD may bring a sea change to ‘retailization’ as hedge funds will be generally permitted to offer their products, 
under strict conditions, to retail investors as well. See Ch. 5, 5.2,4 Convergence is inevitable 
145 Financial services authority, HEDGE FUNDS: A DISCUSSION OF RISK AND REGULATORY ENGAGEMENT, 
FSA, 2005 
146 For instance public employees of San Diego County, California and the State of New Jersey, as well as employees of 
3M, lost pension dollars in the wake of Amaranth's meltdown. Ordinary investors had also contributed significant 
capital to Bernard Madoff’s scam - investors who became indirectly exposed to the fraud by investing in hedge funds 
and funds of funds that invested with Madoff. Additionally, numerous schools, pension plans, and charitable 
foundations had invested with Madoff. See; Craig Karmin, Pension Managers Rethink Their Love of Hedge Funds, The 
Wall Street Journal, 2007; Sklar, supra at 139, 2009. 
147 Franklin R. Edwards, ”Hedge Funds: Creators of Risk?”, Presented at Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial 
Markets Conference, Columbia Business School 2003,  
148 For detailed discussion on the different approaches See Eun Jip Kim, Rethinking Hedge Fund Regulation: Focusing 
on the U.S., the U.K., and Korea, Maurer School of Law: Indiana University, 2014 
149 Command-and-control instruments are the most traditional methods of effecting a behavioural change in the subjects 
of regulation. A command is “an order backed by threats.” Therefore, the non-compliance or violation of such an order 
triggers coercive sanctions on the part of the state. In this method of regulation, the law uses traditional rules to further 
certain policy objectives; See John Austin, The province of Jurisprudence Determined, 1832, pp. 18-37 
150 See Nabilou and M. Pacces, 2015 supra at 12. 
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(quasi) self-regulatory organizations in cooperation with the regulators, effectively minimizing the 
regulators’ direct intervention.151 
The pre-financial crisis era contained substantial debate whether hedge funds should be directly 
regulated or not.  However,, as previously desciribed, before the crisis it was widely held that the 
objectives of hedge fund regulation could be achieved by indirect regulation, and after the crisis the 
regulatory stance gradually shifted towards direct regulation.152 The main reasons coincide with the 
objectives of financial regulation. In order to make the system more robust during times of distress, 
it’s necessary to regulate hedge funds, even if they weren’t the main culprits of the crisis from 
systemic perspective.153 Furthermore, the evidence from financial crisis seemed to justify a paradigm 
shift154 for policymakers towards more strictly regulated hedge fund industry. Thus, the question 
gradually shifted from whether indirect or direct regulation is the right approach to how should hedge 
funds be regulated.155 With AIFMD the approach chosen is regulating the manager. This is arguably 
one of the most consistent156  ways of regulating hedge funds.  
  
                                                         
151 Jip Kim, supra at 148, 2014 
152 Jip Kim, supra at 148, 2014  
153 Even if hedge fund collapses didn’t really contribute to the crisis, regulators have generally taken a pre-emptive 
stance in the post crisis environment. This is based on the viewpoint, that there remains risks that collapse of a large 
hedge fund or myriad of smaller hedge funds, could cause failure of systemically important financial institution, which 
in turn would cause market wide problems, that would affect the real economy.  
154 See Ch. 3, 3.2 AIFMD background 
155 There are still arguments that indirect regulation would yield overall better response. See Nabilou and M. Pacces, 
supra at 11, 2015  
156 See ref. 19 
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3. Introduction to AIFMD  
3.1. Hedge fund regulation in EU prior to AIFMD 
 
Although there was no direct European legislation on the funds themselves, the various service 
providers within the hedge fund industry were already subject, to varying degrees, to numerous 
European Directives including the Market Abuse Directive, Capital Adequacy Directive, Money 
Laundering Directive, the Capital Requirement Directive, the Prospectus Directive (PD) and the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).157 The directives also covered parts of hedge 
fund and alternative investment fund industry. In particular, many assets managers of AIF’s were 
licensed for portfolio management under MiFID, while the sales of fund units that qualified as 
securities were subject to the PD.158 
Quaglia points out that the EU-level regulation could be theoretically described as a competition 
between two regulatory paradigms, market-shaping, and market-making paradigm.159 The countries 
embracing the market-shaping paradigm prioritised consumer protection, financial stability, and 
veiled protectionism. The countries adopting the market-making paradigm privileged competition, 
market efficiency and financial innovation. Market-making paradigm was particularly advocated by 
the UK and the ‘market-shaping’ paradigm supported by Mediterranean countries and, in several 
instances, Germany. In fact, even prior to the financial crisis, the long-standing goal of the advocates 
of regulation had been a directive regulating hedge funds.160 However, at Union level regulation was 
left to member states discretion. This was in line with UK’s preference and with recommendation´s 
issued by the international bodies such as IOSCO and financial stability forum (FSF). In addition, 
Presidents Working Group in the US had had recommended indirect regulation.161 
Several member states had national regulatory regimes in place, though. These regimes typically 
involved registration requirements and oversight of hedge fund managers, as well as structural 
separation of the hedge fund manager and the custodian.162 In countries such as in France and 
                                                         
157 EC, Report of the Alternative Investment Expert Group: Managing, Servicing and Marketing Hedge Funds in 
Europe, European Commission Internal Market and Services DG, 2006, pp.16 
158 Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012 pp. 1-19 
159 Lucia Quaglia, The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Political Economy of Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union, West 
European Politics, 34:4, 2011, pp. 665-682 
160 Id. 
161 See PWG, supra at 50, 1999; See FSF, supra at 95, 2000: IOSCO, Hedge funds and Other Highly Leveraged 
Institutions, Report of the Technical Committee, 1999 
162 EC, supra at 157, 2006 
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Germany, the fund itself was a (quite strictly) regulated onshore vehicle, although often it could be 
domiciled in a third country. On the other hand, the UK naturally preferred a lighter regime163. 164 
 
3.2. AIFMD background 
 
The financial crisis gave the attempt to regulate hedge funds in the EU new momentum. The crisis 
did not substantially alter the configuration of interests concerning hedge fund regulation in the EU. 
However, it did impinge upon existing regulatory paradigms because it was seen as implicitly 
validating the ‘market-shaping’ approach exposed by the pro-regulation countries.165 European 
Parliament produced several reports on the possibility and reasoning of regulating hedge funds and 
private equity (including the Rasmussen166 and Lehne167 reports), as the regulatory atmosphere was 
turning towards more alternative investment fund specific regulation. 
 
3.2.1. Political process behind AIFMD 
 
Quaglia provides evidence that the political motivations168 of Germany and France, backed by some 
members of the European Parliament (EP), were the driving forces in the redesign of EU regulation. 
Their actions were also motivated by institutionally-shaped economic interests,169 but were also 
informed by their ‘market-shaping’ regulatory approach concerning financial services. The global 
financial crisis partly discredited what could be labelled as the ‘British model’ of financial services 
                                                         
163 The British Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) merely required hedge fund managers to be authorised 
FCMA, Section 19. Hedge funds were also subject to oversight of FSA.  
164 Quaglia, supra at 159, 2011 
165 Id. 
166 European Parliament (EP), Report of the European Parliament with Recommendations to the Commission on Hedge 
Funds and Private Equity, A6- 0338/2008. 
167 European Parliament (EP), Report of the European Parliament with Recommendations to the Commission on 
Transparency of Institutional Investors, A6- 0296-2008 
168 Quaglia emphasises that this assessment on the motivations of AIFMD was enhanced even further by the fact there 
were purely domestic political reasons – such as forthcoming general elections in Germany and President Sarkozy’s 
attempt to increase his political capital in France – that motivated German and French political leaders to be seen as 
tough in regulating hedge funds and private equity funds. See Quaglia, supra at 159, 2011 
169 An interest-based account would focus on the costs and benefits of hedge fund regulation for the main stakeholders, 
in particular the large member states. According to this explanation, member states are keen to set in place EU rules that 
are in line with their domestic regulatory approach and do not create comparative disadvantages or adjustment costs for 
national industry and the public authorities. Id. 
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regulation170, which had been the established model in the EU since the late 1990s and had informed 
a large part of the EU rules adopted prior to the global financial crisis.171  
After protracted negotiations, During the April 2009 summit in London, G20 Leaders agreed that 
hedge funds or their managers should be registered and should be required to disclose appropriate 
information on an ongoing basis to supervisors or regulators. They should be subject to oversight to 
ensure that they have adequate risk management.172 In addition other jurisdictions developed similar 
frameworks to regulate managers of AIFs, in particular, the US with the Dodd-Frank Act.173 The 
consensus reached was seen as a victory for France and Germany, which advocated the need for a 
comprehensive regulatory architecture in the face of resistance from the UK, where most of the 
European hedge funds are based.174 In June 2009, the European Commission presented its proposal 
for the draft directive on AIFMs, which included managers of hedge funds, private equity funds, and 
real estate funds, hence practically covering all collective investment vehicles which are not 
UCITSD.175 Thus, the scope of the directive was much broader than originally envisioned.  
Although some alternative views176 about financial services regulation began to emerge in the UK as 
well, it took a highly critical stance on the directive. The original draft was highly criticized for being 
“politically driven effort to place obstacles in the way of an industry that is almost exclusively based 
in the US and the UK”.177 After intense lobbying from industry, the US and the UK, the draft directive 
was partly revised178 during the Swedish presidency of the EU that began in July 2009.179 An 
agreement between the Council of Ministers and the EP was eventually reached in late October 2010, 
and the directive entered into force in 2013180.181 
                                                         
170 Alongside AIFMD, the financial crisis unleashed a number of new European asset management directives, such as 
IORPD, UCITSD 4, MiFID 2. 
171 Quaglia, supra at 159, 2011. 
172 AIMFD, Recital 89  
173 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. 111-203, H.R. 4173), Title IV, also known 
as the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 
174 Quaglia, supra at 159, 2011 
175 Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (2009a). Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, 30 April 
176 The Turner review acknowledged that authorities should have the power to gather information on all significant 
unregulated financial institutions (e.g. hedge funds) to allow assessment of overall system-wide risks. Regulators should 
have the power to extend prudential regulation of capital and liquidity or impose other restrictions if any institution or 
group of institutions develops bank-like features that threaten financial stability and/or otherwise become systemically 
significant. See FSA, supra at 113, 2009 
177 Paul Marshall, Europe’s classic exercise in closet protectionism, The Financial Times, 2009 
178 There were many dubious provisions and overlaps with other directives with the initial draft, such as outright ban on 
reverse solicitation and restrictions to short selling.  
179 According to Zetzsche, some initial drafts of the directive were even leaked, which led to aggressive lobbying by 
certain participants. See Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012, pp. 1-19 
180 See Appendix 7: AIFMD Timeline 
181 Quaglia, supra at 159, 2011. 
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3.2.2. Regulatory technique and ESMA powers 
 
The regulatory process follows the so-called ‘Lamfalussy’ approach. According to this process, the 
EC may adopt measures as binding technical standards, which are implementing technical standards 
and regulatory technical standards. Regulatory technical standards are delegated acts. The Parliament 
and Council may raise objections to the delegated act and therefore prevent the act from entering into 
force. On other hand, implementing technical standards cannot be overturned by the Parliament or 
Council. ESMA is empowered to draft both kinds of binding technical standards which the 
Commission may subsequently adopt. Moreover, the AIFMD foresees ESMA guidelines which have 
binding effect upon the supervisory authorities within the EU.182 ESMA also has the power to request 
competent authorities to prohibit marketing in the EU of non-authorized AIFs, impose management 
related restrictions on non-EU AIFMs in the case of concentration of risk in a specific market or when 
their activities potentially constitute an important source of counterparty risk to systematically 
relevant institutions.183 These powers are significant considering the broad and ambiguous wording 
of the directive. 
The AIFMD framework consists of several legislative acts. The basis constitutes the AIFMD, which 
has been implemented as a national bill by member states. Since the AIFMD principles are rather 
vague, the directive is complemented by the Commission Delegated Regulation (AIFMD-CDR). The 
AIFMD-CDR takes direct effect in the EU Members States, pursuant to the process contemplated 
under the Lisbon Treaty.184  According to Aremendia, the implementation of AIFMD-CDR, has 
achieved a great deal by making the regime far more workable than many in the industry had 
anticipated.185  
 
3.3. AIFMD Objectives  
 
The general objective of AIFMD, is to provide an internal market for AIFMs and a harmonized and 
stringent regulatory and supervisory framework for the activities within the Union of all AIFMs, 
including those which have their registered office in a Member State (EU AIFMs) and those which 
                                                         
182 Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012, pp. 1-19 
183 AIFMD, Article 47, 4, (a)-(c) 
184 Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012, pp. 1-19; Treaty of Lisbon, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European community, 2007/C 306/01, available at; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:C2007/306/01&from=EN  
185 Mirzha de Manuel Aremendia, Implementing the AIFMD: Success or failure?, ECMI Commentary No. 34, 2013 
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have their registered office in a third country (non-EU AIFMs).186 The objectives are further detailed 
in the Commission impact assessment. The specific objectives of the directive are monitoring of 
macro-prudential risks i.e. systemic risk, supervising the participants of financial markets, granting a 
high level of investor protection, enhancing management of micro-prudential risks while ensuring 
overall market efficiency. The objectives can be further separated into level 2 issues which include 
the calculations of leverage and AUM for instance187.188 
Zetzsche et al. have distinguished the “between the lines” objectives of AIFMD. The first is risk 
management in a wider sense, with two dimensions to risk management, systemic risk and investor 
protection. 189 These objectives were directly influenced by the financial crisis and the subsequent 
paradigm shift with regards to financial regulation in general. The second political objective is the 
addition of another feature to the single market by granting access to the markets of all Member 
States, subject to strict requirements. The idea was to prevent externalities from profits and losses 
materializing on different members states.190 The third objective may have been the protection of the 
highly regulated, AIFMD-compliant European fund industry from lesser regulated competitors from 
third countries, in particular from the US. Lastly, due to the fact that access to the single market 
coincides with the exchange of tax information, one objective might have been putting pressure on 
offshore domiciles.191 
  
                                                         
186 AIMFD, Recital 4 
187 See Appendix 8; The objectives of AIFMD 
188 EC, Commission staff working document; Impact assessment accompanying the document commission delegated 
regulation supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regards to 
exemptions, general operating conditions, depositories, leverage, transparency and supervision, 2012 
189 Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012 pp. 1-19 
190 Id. 
191 id. 
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4. Content of AIFMD 
4.1. Scope and definition 
 
According to AIMFD, alternative investment funds192 (AIF) are defined as collective investment 
undertakings, including investment compartments thereof, which: use capital from a number of 
investors, with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit 
of those investors; and do not require authorization according to UCITSD.193  Thus, AIFMD basically 
takes “one-size-fits-all” approach as it includes all funds which raise capital194 from a number of 
investors195 with a defined investment policy196. The definition is rather exhaustive – most of the non-
UCITSD funds fall under the scope, to such degree that there is no necessity to provide a laborious 
definition on all the different alternative investments. The scope of the definition also covers almost 
all hedge fund structures.  
Unsurprisingly, AIFMs’ means legal persons whose regular business is managing one or more 
AIFs.197 Management of AIFs should mean providing at least investment management services. The 
single AIFM to be appointed pursuant to this Directive should never be authorised to provide portfolio 
management without also providing risk management or vice versa.198 
The AIFM regime applies to EU AIFMs managing one or more EU AIFs/non-EU AIFs; Non-EU 
AIFMs managing one or more EU AIFs; Non-EU AIFMs marketing AIFs in the EU.199 The only 
scenario where AIFM does not fall within the scope of the AIFM regime is the situation of a non-EU 
AIFM managing and/or marketing a non-EU AIF outside the EU given the absence of any relationship 
with the EU.200 
                                                         
192 The terms AIF and AIFM are used liberally throughout the chapter to generally refer to hedge funds, however, it 
must be emphasized they cover wide array of investment vehicles. 
193 AIMFD, Article 4, 1, (a) 
194 Raising capital can take place once (closed-end fund) or on an ongoing basis (open-ended) funds. See Laurent 
Fessman, Jeremy Muszkatblit and Ramzi Sahli, Scope of the AIFMD, Baker & McKenzie, 2013 
195 An undertaking will not be an AIF if its instruments of incorporation state that the vehicle must have only one 
investor. Even if an undertaking only has one investor, it will still be considered to raise capital from a number of 
investors where its rules do not limit the sale of units/shares to a single investor. Id. 
196 Factors which may indicate existence of defined investment policy; 1. Policy forms part of the rules or instruments 
of incorporation of the undertaking 2. Undertaking (or manager) has a legal obligation to investors to follow the policy 
3. Policy specifies investment guidelines with reference to geographical regions, restrictions on leverage, holding 
periods or risk diversification. Id. 
197 AIMFD, Article 4, 1, (b) 
198 AIMFD, Recital 21 
199 AIFMD, Article 2,1, (a)-(c) 
200 Association of the Luxembourg fund industry (ALFI), The alternative investment fund managers directive, 
Luxembourg implementation, 2013 
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AIFMD provides for a limited number of exemptions (including grandfathering201 provisions for 
certain existing fund structures) and also a lighter touch ‘registration’ regime for managers with 
limited assets under management. The directive does not apply to holding companies, employee 
participation schemes or employee savings schemes etc.202 In addition, exemptions are provided for 
AIFM’s managing smaller AIFs (de minimis threshold)  i.e. AIFMs managing AIFs which are not 
leveraged and without redemption rights for a period of 5 years, and with aggregate assets under 
management below EUR 500 million and AIFMs managing AIFs whose assets under management, 
including any assets acquired through the use of leverage, do not exceed EUR 100 million.203 Such 
exempted AIFMs are subject to regular reporting and registration requirements with NCA’s only. In 
terms of relevance to hedge funds, it seems mainly unleveraged funds which manage assets below 
100 million may benefit from this, but they also have the chance to “opt in”.  
It’s also worth noting regards to exemptions, that investment undertakings, such as family office204 
vehicles, which invest private wealth of investors without raising external capital, should not be 
considered to be AIFs in accordance with the Directive.205 Prima facie, it would be unfair and 
somewhat counterintuitive to bring these AIFMs who by nature, do not manage external investors’ 
capital or market funds under the scope of the directive. However these private managers have 
accumulated a lot of wealth, and their actions have a major impact on markets. This has prompted 
some commentary that it’s only a matter of time they are brought under the regulatory radar as well.206 
Practical consequences 
The one-size-fits-all approach of the AIFMD bears several consequences to the industry. First borders 
of entry for the hedge fund industry are significantly increased. This may have hindering effects on 
market efficiency, particularly in less liquid European markets. Smaller funds are especially known 
for investing in such segments where larger funds steer clear of (small-cap stocks for instance).  
Second, it has also already lead to further consolidation within the industry and thus reduced 
                                                         
201 The AIFM Law foresees the following two grandfathering provisions for AIFMs managing closed-ended AIFs: If 
they do not make additional investments after 22 July 2013, they may continue to manage such AIFs without 
authorization under the AIFM Law; If their subscription period for investors closed prior to the entry into force of the 
AIFM Law and if their term expires at the latest in 2016, they may continue to manage such AIFs without authorization 
under the AIFM Law but must publish an annual report and, when applicable, comply with the disclosure requirements 
on the acquisition of portfolio companies. Id. 
202 For comprehensive list see AIFMD, Article 2,3 
203 AIFMD, Article 3,2, (a) and (b) 
204 When a hedge fund becomes a family office, all funds are returned to outside investors and the new entity runs the 
money of the manager and his or her family members alone. Some of the most prominent hedge fund managers such as 
George Soros and Steven Cohen have chosen to operate under family office due to increased regulatory pressures. See 
Madison Marriage, Hedge funds’ move to become family offices is not entirely popular, The Financial Times, 2015 
205 AIFMD, article 3, 1 
206 See IOSCO, supra at 36, 2009 
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competition.207  Finally, due to wide scope, AIFMD establishes for the first time uniform rules on the 
industry. This should, in principle reduce legal uncertainty significantly. It should be much harder for 
hedge funds to circumvent regulation with the adoption of AIFMD. 
 
4.2. Authorization 
 
Providing common requirements for governing the authorization and supervision of AIFMs is one of 
the main objectives of AIFMD. 208 The directive requires that all member states ensure no AIFMs 
manage or market AIFs unless they are authorized in accordance with the directive.209 The managers 
are subject to a general prohibition which will be lifted once they are authorized. Authorization may 
be withdrawn if the competent authorities see it compromised. 210  
Application for authorization is submitted to the national competent authorities.211 In order to get the 
authorization, AIFMs need to provide extensive amounts of information relating to the AIF and 
AIFM. In terms of AIFM, information is required on the persons effectively conducting the business 
of the AIFM, on the remuneration policies, and information on the identities of AIFM shareholders. 
With regards to AIFs, information requirements concern, for example, the investment strategies, 
where the master AIF is established, if the AIF is a feeder AIF and information on depositary in 
accordance with article 21.212 
The directive also requires minimum regulatory capital for the AIFMs. The minimum regulatory 
capital measures are intended for control of runs as they act as a buffer. Member States shall require 
that an AIFM, which is an internally managed AIF has an initial capital of at least EUR 300 000.213 
Where an AIFM is appointed as external manager of AIFs, the AIFM shall have an initial capital of 
at least EUR 125 000.214 Where the value of the portfolios of AIFs managed by the AIFM exceeds 
EUR 250 million, the AIFM shall provide an additional amount of own funds. That additional amount 
of own funds shall be equal to 0,02 % of the amount by which the value of the portfolios of the AIFM 
exceeds EUR 250 million, but the required total of the initial capital, and the additional amount shall 
                                                         
207 According to survey conducted by BNY Mellon and FTI Consulting, five per cent of AIFs surveyed are expected to 
be closed, merged or sold, potentially resulting in less choice for investors. BNY Mellon, Over 80% of fund managers 
have yet to seek AIFMD authorisation as July compliance deadline looms, according to new BNY Mellon survey, 2014 
208 AIFMD, Recital 2 
209 AIFMD, Article 6,1 and Recital 18 
210 AIFMD, Article 11 
211 AIFMD, Article 7.1 
212 AIFMD, Article 7.2 and 7.3 
213 AIFMD, Article 9.1 
214 AIFMD, Article 9.2 
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not, however, exceed EUR 10 million.215 These funds are required to be invested in liquid assets or 
assets readily convertible to cash in short them and cannot include speculative positions.216 AIFMs 
must also cover potential professional liability risks trough either additional own funds to cover risks 
from professional negligence or hold an appropriate professional indemnity insurance against such 
risks.217 For calculating regulatory capital requirements, AIFMD-CDR specifies that it is the sum of 
absolute value of all assets with derivative valued at their market price.218 
Practical consequences 
In order to be authorized, the directive requires AIFMs to provide extensive amounts of information, 
for instance about the persons effectively conducting business. This should help the regulators better 
assess the more dubious hedge fund structures. In addition, the ability of investors to learn about the 
persons effectively conducting the investment process may be inhibited by the fact that hedge funds 
transcend multiple jurisdictions.219 With AIFMD, it should be easier for investors to assess who is 
factually behind the business.220  
The requirement to invest own capital in a fund is also a powerful incentive. This mitigates the 
dilemma between hedge funds receiving performance fees, but not having to pay for losses.221 
However, many hedge fund managers have voluntarily done this anyway. In addition the capital 
requirements seem rather superfluous, considering the amounts are not going to meet any larger 
investor redemption requests for most funds, which are unlevered. Conversely, for some firms, which 
use substantial amount of derivatives and sophisticated hedging techniques it will be a considerable 
increase in their regulatory capital. Depending on their asset base, it may be difficult to set aside such 
capital.222  
 
 
                                                         
215 AIFMD, Article 9.3 
216 AIFMD, Article 9.8 
217 AIFMD, Article 9.9 a-c;  
218 PWC, The AIFM: Getting authorised, 2013; AIFMD-CDR, Recital 35; See also appendix for example on 
calculations for minimum regulatory capital and own funds. 
219 See Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012, pp. 109-135 
220 It’s notable that huge losses, and even frauds tend to be asymmetrically caused by unregistered hedge funds. For 
instance David Mobley’s Maricopa was not registered nor audited. See Edwards, supra at 135, 2000 
221 However, this asymmetry is alleviated by the fact that hedge funds typically employ high watermark i.e. they won’t 
be able to charge performance fees without profits. Furthermore, most successful managers invest substantial amounts 
of own capital in the fund. Thus they have a high incentive to mitigate losses as it’s extremely difficult to claw back to 
profitability from a high drawdown. 
222 PWC, supra at 218, 2013; an example would be a hedge fund using many offsetting hedges, which enlarges its gross 
asset base. 
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4.3. Operating conditions  
 
AIFMs will have several new obligations related to operating conditions.223 The provisions on 
remuneration, valuation, liquidity management, risk management, delegation, and depositaries are 
discussed in further detail here. Corporate governance issues, such as operating principles and 
provisions of conflict of interests are only briefly outlined.   
The AIFM Law contains several principle-based rules on general operating conditions. In short, the 
general operating principles that apply to AIFMs are similar to the rules of conduct laid down in the 
UCITS Directive, which basically constitute the fundaments of fiduciary law.224  The operating 
principles require for instance that AIFM will act with due diligence and care, honesty, comply with 
regulations, ensure fair treatment of investors225 and act in the best interests of the AIFs they 
manage.226 In terms of conflict of interests, AIFMs are required to maintain and operate effective 
organizational and administrative arrangements with a view to taking all reasonable steps designed 
to identify, prevent, manage and monitor conflicts of interest in order to prevent them from adversely 
affecting the interests of the AIFs and their investors.227  
 
4.3.1. Remuneration 
 
AIMFD tries to reign excessive remuneration practices. It imposes a general requirement of installing 
such remuneration policies that do not encourage risk taking228 for those employees of AIFMs whose 
activities have a material impact on the risk profiles of the AIFMs or of the AIFs they manage. AIFMs 
will also need to establish an independent and competent remuneration committee.229 AIFMs will 
have substantial requirements to comply with the new principles laid down in Annex II, in a way and 
to the extent that is appropriate to their size, internal organization and the nature, scope and 
complexity of their activities.230 
                                                         
223 AIFMD, Articles 12-20 
224 See Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012, pp. 159-199 
225 For instance usage of side letters will still be possible, but AIF has to clearly disclose that with its rules. See AIFMD-
CDR, ANNEX IV 
226 AIFMD, Article 12, 1, (a)-(f) 
227 AIFMD, Article 15 
228 AIFMD, Article 13, 1 
229 AIFMD, ANNEX II, 2; See ESMA guidelines for role of the remuneration committee. ESMA, Guidelines on sound 
remuneration policies under the AIFMD, 2013, pp. 15 
230 AIFMD, ANNEX II 
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Practical consequences 
The typical hedge fund remuneration structure, where the manager is rewarded with significant 
performance fee on good years and no clawback in bad years, may encourage excessive risk-taking.231 
While investment to fund by the manager may serve to alleviate high risk-taking, the asymmetry 
remains, if the manager does not have a significant proportion of his wealth invested in the fund. In 
addition, in a low-return environment, certain hedge fund still continue employing controversial 
remuneration practices, without delivering alpha. 232  Thus, it is reasonable AIFMD reigns these 
practices. As the hedge funds have to comply with the requirements of ANNEX II reporting, it is 
likely that excessive risk taking is controlled externally. Some of the controversial remuneration 
practices are also reigned, as according to ESMA, measures such as golden parachutes and guaranteed 
bonuses are inconsistent with AIFMD.233 
 
4.3.2. Valuation  
 
AIFMD requires that appropriate and consistent procedures are established so that a proper and 
independent valuation of the assets of the AIF can be performed.234  Thus AIFMD provides uniform 
standards with valuation for the first time in Europe. The key issues and provisions to consider with 
regards to valuation are: 235 
 which entities are permitted to carry out the valuation function;  
 the classification of an external valuation agent;   
 the liability provisions in relation to the valuation function; and 
 the valuation procedures under the AIFMD;   
Valuation function can be either performed by external valuer, who is a legal or natural person 
independent (or any close links) from the AIF and AIFM or the AIFM itself, provided that the 
valuation task is functionally and hierarchically independent236 from portfolio management and 
                                                         
231 FSA, supra at 113, 2009 
232 The common hedge fund fee structure has lately received some significant criticism. See Madison Marriage, Oaktree 
founder attacks hedge fund fees, The Financial Times, 2015; Steve Denning, How Hedge Funds Transfer Wealth From 
Investors To Managers, Forbes, 2013; See also ref. 55 and 56 
233 ESMA, supra at 229, 2013, pp. 2 
234 AIFMD, Article 19, 1 
235 Matheson, AIFMD Factsheet: Valuation, 2014  
236 This terminology is crucial part of AIFMD. In practice “functional” and “hierarchical” separation means for 
instance, separate personnel and separate supervision. 
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remuneration policies, and other measures ensure that conflict of interests are mitigated.237 In addition 
the directive explicitly implies that external valuer cannot delegate the valuation function to a third 
party.238 Furthermore delegating valuation tasks to external valuer does not allow for the 
circumvention of the AIFM’s responsibilities or liability.239 The external valuation agent is, however, 
liable to the AIFM for any losses suffered by the AIFM as a result of the external valuation agent’s 
negligence or intentional failure to perform its tasks. This liability is irrespective of any contractual 
arrangements providing otherwise.240 
With regards to valuation procedures used, AIFMs are required to ensure that the assets are valued, 
and net asset value (NAV) per unit or share is calculated at least once per year. Open-ended funds 
need to carry out more frequent valuations, whereas closed-ended funds need to carry out valuations 
when capital increases or decreases. 241 In addition, AIFMs are required to provide a description of 
the AIF’s valuation procedure and of the pricing methodology for valuing assets, including the 
methods used in valuing hard-to-value assets.242 The rules applicable to the valuation of assets and 
the calculation of the net asset value per unit or share of the AIF are laid down in the law of the 
country where the AIF is established and/or in the AIF rules or instruments of incorporation.243 
Practical consequences 
Ensuring proper valuation is key for providing understanding on the riskiness of hedge funds assets 
In addition ensuring the independence of valuer is important for preventing frauds and ensuring the 
funds assets are not overvalued. Although many of the procedures with regards to valuation – such 
as ensuring valuer independence – were somewhat applied by fund managers244, AIFMD introduces 
coherent standards on valuation procedures, which are important in order to harmonize the divergent 
practices across Europe. This should prevent some of the abuses related to valuation.  
 
 
 
                                                         
237 AIFMD, Article 19,4, (a) and (b) 
238 AIFMD, Article 19,6 
239 AIFMD-CDR, Article 75, (a) 
240 Matheson, supra at 235, 2014 
241 AIFMD, Article 19,3 
242 ALFI, supra at 200, 2013 
243 AIFMD, Article 19,2 
244 AIMFD, Recital 29 
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4.3.3. Risk management 
 
It is beyond question that the financial crisis perilously highlighted the importance of re-assessing 
and enhancing risk management practices throughout the entire financial sector, including hedge 
funds. The crisis subsequently lead to “sea change” of a trend in how risk management is regulated 
and effectively conducted by asset managers.245 AIFMD follows this changing trend, and sets risk 
management besides portfolio management, as the core business function of AIFMs.246 As put by 
KPMG, risk management is at the heart of AIFMs activity as it is linked to valuation, disclosures, 
capital and liability issues, etc.247  
According to AIFMD, AIFM should never be authorized to provide portfolio management without 
also providing risk management or vice versa.248  The provisions of AIFMD and AIFMD-CDR 
convey rules on establishing adequate risk management systems which are understood as both 
organizational elements – placing a central role on a permanent risk management function – as well 
as policies and procedures to measure and manage risks in relation to each AIF. 249  
AIFMs are required to functionally and hierarchically250 separate the functions of risk management 
from the operating units, including from the functions of portfolio management.251 The AIFM is 
required to implement adequate risk management systems in order to identify, measure, manage, and 
monitor appropriately all risks relevant to each AIF investment strategy and to which each AIF is or 
may be exposed. 252 These risks include, inter alia, the typical market, liquidity, credit, counterparty 
and operational risks. 253 An AIFM shall establish and implement quantitative or qualitative risk 
limits, or both, for each AIF it manages, taking into account all relevant risks. Where only qualitative 
limits are set, the AIFM shall be able to justify this approach to the competent authority.254 
                                                         
245 BNY Mellon, Risk Roadmap: Hedge Funds and Investors Evolving Approach to Risk, 2012 
246 AIFMD-CDR, Recital 86 
247 KPMG, AIFMD RISK MANAGEMENT, 2014 
248 AIFMD, Recital 21 
249 See ALFI, Risk Management under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, 2014 
250 On conditions when risk management function is ”functionally” and ”hierarchically” separated see AIFMD-CDR, 
Article 42, (a)-(b).  
251 AIFMD, Article 15, 1 
252 AIFMD, Article 15, 2 
253 Market risks are typically related to volatility, caused by unexpected moves in the markets. Liquidity risks rise from 
investor’s redemptions requests, sudden contractions in liquidity during turmoil and generally from investments on 
illiquid products. Credit risks arise from widening credit spreads. Counterparty risks are generally related to 
counterparty default risks. Operational risks include losses from failure of ordinary business processes, for instance 
failure to value funds assets correctly.  
254 AIFMD-CDR, Article 44, 1 
38 
 
AIFMs shall review the risk management systems with appropriate frequency at least once a year and 
adapt them whenever necessary.255 Furthermore, AIFMs need to ensure regular reporting on risk 
management matters to internal governing bodies and investors. The AIFMD stresses in many cases 
the principle of proportionality taking into account the structure and complexity of the AIFM and the 
AIF it manages. Reporting frequency depends on the size and systemic relevance of the AIFM, for 
instance, smaller AIFM might need to report only on an annual basis, while systemically relevant 
AIFM should report at least on a quarterly basis.256 
Practical consequences 
The main change with AIFMD is that it renders risk management a core activity.  
AIFMs will need to show that their risk function manages counterparty, liquidity, and operational 
risk, as well as the investment risk, what was traditionally the main focus of such function. 257 
Considering the shortcomings in risk management during the financial crisis – particularly due to 
imperfect risk measurement258 understating risks – such rules are a welcome development. The risk 
management provisions should help the regulators assess the relevant risks with regards to AIFMs, 
and ensure that appropriate risk management procedures are undertaken by the AIFM. Furthermore, 
more transparency and risk reporting to investors should help enhance trust in the industry. However, 
the implementation of the principle of proportionality with regards to different strategies, the size 
AIFMs, and the relevant risks cannot be emphasized enough. There also remains an argument that 
changes in risk management were already taking place within the industry.259 
 
4.3.4. Liquidity management 
 
Issues with regards to the illiquidity of assets during crisis times have been well documented. Even 
extremely liquid markets can dry during the times of serious shock (as witnessed by US short-term 
                                                         
255 AIFMD, Article 15, 2 
256 ALFI, supra at 249, 2014 
257 Sophia Grene, Hedge funds split over AIFMD risk management rules, The Financial Times, 2014 
258Arguably the most maligned metric in risk measurement is Value at Risk (VaR). The main issue with VaR and 
similar metrics is that they use historical data, whilst markets tend to be dynamic and constantly evolving. While such 
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management, AIMA, 2013 
259 Zetzsche, 2012, supra at 10, pp. 265-331  
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credit markets during the financial crisis). Many sources260 indicate that the financial crisis was 
characterised as a typical liquidity crisis, initially in excess of it and thereafter total collapse of 
liquidity. Although lack or abundance of liquidity in hedge funds wasn’t the root of the crisis, they 
nevertheless are exposed to liquidity risks with regards to their illiquid positions and counterparties. 
In addition hedge funds have employed for long some controversial strategies to manage illiquid 
positions and to prevent investor redemptions, which some261 consider are in a dire need of change. 
The two key components for management of liquidity risk are (i) the management of asset liquidity, 
in particular with illiquid assets and the related valuation problems; and (ii) the management of 
redemption requests.262 Thus, AIFMD requires that AIFMs ensure that the investment strategy, the 
liquidity profile, and the redemption policy are consistent.263 With regards to asset liquidity risk 
management AIFMD seeks to establish new standards in order to ensure that AIFMs apply 
appropriate liquidity management systems264, adopt procedures that enable AIFM to monitor AIF’s 
liquidity risk and regularly conduct stress tests under normal and exceptional conditions. 265 The 
delegated regulation contains more specific rules on redemption policies and ‘special 
arrangements’.266  The use of tools and special arrangements to manage liquidity should be made 
dependent on concrete circumstances and should vary according to the nature, scale and investment 
strategy of the AIF.267  
The investment strategy, liquidity profile and redemption policy of each AIF managed by an AIFM 
shall be considered to be aligned when investors have the ability to redeem their investments in a 
manner consistent with the fair treatment of all AIF investors and in accordance with the AIF’s 
redemption policy and its obligations.268 In assessing the alignment of the investment strategy, 
liquidity profile, and redemption policy, the AIFM shall also have regard to the impact that 
redemptions may have on the underlying prices or spreads of the individual assets of the AIF.269 
                                                         
260 Philip E. Strahan, Liquidity Risk and Credit in the Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco, 2012; 
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Practical consequences 
Fire sales and deleveraging stemming from substantial investor redemption requests may pose risks 
to overall functioning on financial markets. In some cases, provisions on gating and side pockets can 
help to mitigate these risks270, yet it is undeniable that overarching principle must be the fair treatment 
of investors acknowledging that the redemption of shares is a fundamental right.271 In practice AIFMs 
will need to abide by a defined policy with respect to redemptions, which shouldn’t prevent hedge 
funds from employing special arrangements such as gates as usual, however, it must be in the best 
interests of the investor. This should prevent AIMFs from employing some of the more 
controversial272 practices. The decision to suspend an AIF must be in the best interest of all investors 
and should deal with any conflicts of interests arising between investors wishing to redeem their 
investments and those investors wishing to maintain their investments in the fund’s portfolio.273 
With regards to managing asset liquidity, AIFMs need to prove they have adequate liquidity 
management systems in place, and they need to provide, inter alia, regulators information on the 
result of stress tests and how fast the portfolio could be liquidated.274 Placing emphasis on multiple 
scenario stress testing with regards to asset liquidity is certainly a step forward. This should address 
the problem that stress testing is based on too narrow, historical scenarios.  
 
4.3.5. Delegation 
 
Hedge funds have for long been used to delegate parts of the business to external entities, due to the 
cost efficiency of the arrangements and in order to maintain deeper focus on the core activity of the 
fund, i.e. portfolio management. In addition, the delegation model where third party investment 
managers and advisers are appointed has become increasingly common.275 The underlying idea is that 
cross-border delegation of portfolio management activities allows greater access to different markets 
and investor bases. 
                                                         
270 When funds are unable to issue gates and lockdowns sensibly, they may have to sell positions - whether they are 
liquid or not - to meet redemptions. The resulting likelihood that the fund is selling at depressed prices will be 
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271 Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012 pp. 253-264  
272 During financial crisis, one prominent hedge fund was said to have charged a departing investor for a fee for early 
redemption; then it blocked the redemption, refused to return the fee, and carried on charging a management fee on top 
of that. Mallaby, supra at 109, 2010, pp. 425 
273 Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012 pp. 253-264 
274 AIFMD-CDR, ANNEX IV 
275 Mark Browne, Delegation of investment management under the AIFMD, AIMA, 2013 
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AIFMD continues to allow delegation, however with certain restrictions. The overarching principles 
are outlined in AIFMD Recital 30. Subject to strict limitations and requirements, including the 
existence of (1) objective reasons, an AIFM should be able to delegate the carrying out of some of its 
functions on its behalf in accordance with this Directive so as to increase the efficiency of the conduct 
of its business.  Subject to the same conditions, sub-delegation should also be allowed. AIFMs should, 
however, remain responsible for the proper performance of the delegated functions and compliance 
with this Directive at all times, i.e. the AIFM cannot turn into (2) a letter-box entity.276 
AIFMs are required to notify competent authorities before the delegation agreements become 
effective, and they must be able to justify the delegation structure on objective reasons.277 These 
objective reasons include for instance costs savings, optimising of business functions and processes, 
the expertise of the delegate in administration or in specific markets or investments and access to 
delegates global trading activities.278  
Core functions i.e. risk management and portfolio management can be only delegated under strict 
conditions.279 Whilst AIFMD retains the possible of, say European AIFM delegating its portfolio 
management to US investment manager, the agreement is subject to following provisions: 
 It must be conferred only on undertakings which are authorised or registered for the purpose 
of asset management and subject to supervision or, where that condition cannot be met, only 
subject to prior approval by the competent authorities of the home Member State of the 
AIFM.280 
 In addition cooperation between the competent authorities of the home Member State of the 
AIFM and the supervisory authority of the undertaking must be ensured. 281 
 No delegation can be conferred on the depositary or any other entity whose interest may 
conflict with those of the AIFM or the investors of the AIF.282 
One of the most important provisions regarding delegation in the AIFMD-CDR is Article 82 which 
sets out when an AIFM will be deemed to be a letter box entity, as a consequence of the amount of 
delegation it has entered into in respect of an AIF.283 The following non-exhaustive list provides 
                                                         
276 AIFMD, Recital 30 
277 AIFMD, Article 20,1 
278 AIFMD-CDR, Article 76  
279 AIFMD Article 20,2 and AIFMD-CDR, Article 78 
280AIFMD, Article 20, 1, (c) 
281 AIFMD, Article 20, 1, (d) 
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examples when AIFM will be deemed letter box entity and will not be considered to be manager of 
AIF; 
 The AIFM no longer retains the necessary expertise and resources to supervise the delegated 
tasks effectively and manage the risks associated with the delegation; 
 The AIFM loses its contractual rights to inquire, inspect, have access or give instructions to 
its delegates or the exercise of such rights becomes impossible in practice; and 
 The AIFM delegates the performance of investment management functions to an extent that 
exceeds by a substantial margin the investment management functions performed by the 
AIFM itself.284 
However, an AIFM will be able to delegate a number of portfolio management functions and a 
number of risk management functions, while at the same time retaining some of each and, 
accordingly, not fall into the trap of being considered a letter-box entity. This will require a degree of 
analysis on a case by case basis.285  
Practical consequences 
In summary, the key prohibition of letter box entity is important in a sense that (1) the delegate has 
become responsible for AIFM functions (2) thus there are often other underlying principles behind 
these delegation structures than objective reasons, in some cases the goal of circumventing the law. 
In addition, the existing delegation model should continue to be effective for AIFM’s, under AIFMD 
but compliance with the relevant requirements contained in the Regulation will entail an amendment 
to existing contractual agreements and extensive additional documentation evidencing how the 
applicable requirements are being met.286  
 
4.3.6. Depositary 
 
The financial crisis triggered a throughout re-assessment of the depositary function within EEA. The 
failure of European Madoff funds to have depositaries is routinely reeled out as an example of the 
necessity of assets safe keeping in light of the severe losses caused to investors.287 In addition, the 
crisis triggered failures of famous prime brokers and depositaries, such as RBS and Fortes, which 
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were bailed by their respective governments. These events, combined with the collapse of Lehman, 
triggered significant fund assets losses throughout EU, which also highlighted existing differences 
between member states with regards to depositaries’ safekeeping duties and liabilities.288 Thus, 
AIFMD Recital 2 outlines that recent developments underline the crucial need to separate asset safe-
keeping and management functions, and to segregate investor assets from those of the manager.289 
With this reasoning, AIFMD introduces a similar depositary function to AIFs, as has been employed 
by UCITS since UCITS I. 
AIFMD requires AIFMs to appoint a single depositary for each AIF it manages.290  Prior to the 
adaptation of AIFMD, Member States enjoyed significant discretion as whether appointment of 
depositary was required and which entities could act as depositary.291 AIFs obligations and assets 
were typically held by the prime broker, the AIF itself or at a credit institution, and thus depositary’s 
tasks was just to ensure asset custody. AIFMD, however, appoints numerous additional tasks to the 
depositary.292  
The depositary has both safekeeping and oversight function. However, a depositary acts not only as 
custodian but also as a sort of monitor of the fund. In the latter role it ensures that the fund’s assets 
are held independently of the investment manager, that the fund’s accounting records are reconciled 
(where appropriate) with third-party records, and that investors’ entitlements are correctly calculated. 
Ultimately, it seeks to safeguard against fraud, book-keeping errors, and conflicts of interest between 
the manager and the fund.293  
The depositary can be a credit institution, an investment firm which complies with certain capital 
adequacy rules and that is authorised to safe keep assets, or another category of institution that is 
subject to prudential regulation and ongoing supervision and which, falls within the categories of 
institution determined by Member States to be eligible to be a depositary under UCITSD294.295  In 
practice, most of the depositaries will be credit institutions i.e. banks or investment firms with 
regulatory permission to act as custodian.296 The AIFMD stipulates that the fund’s the fund’s prime 
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broker can only act as depositary if it has functionally and hierarchically separated the performance 
of its depositary function of the depositary function from the prime brokerage function.297  
The directive greatly alternates the established industry practice by introducing strict liability of 
depositaries.298 Depositaries will be liable to the AIF and its shareholders for loss by the depositary 
or a third party delegate of financial instruments in its custody. Where financial instruments are lost, 
the depositary will be obliged to return a financial instrument of identical type or the corresponding 
value to the AIF without undue delay. The depositary will not be liable where it can demonstrate that 
the loss was as a result of undue delay caused by an external event beyond its reasonable control, the 
consequences of which were unavoidable despite all reasonable efforts to the contrary.299 
Practical consequences 
The main benefits from the AIFMD depositary provisions come from increased investor protection 
due to added harmonization. With the enhanced standards for monitoring, safekeeping and oversight 
of assets, investors should be able to rest assured that most market abuses related to custodial services 
will be avoided. Harmonization of depositary rules makes the service more transparent and 
comparable, which should also reduce regulatory arbitrage and increase legal certainty. 300 This could 
help drive the prices down for the services in the long term, despite the industry initially complaining 
about the costs and complexity of the provisions. 
However, the depositary liability provisions exhibit a multitude of problems. As demonstrated by 
Siena301, the provisions transfer risk to financial intermediaries. Thus, the provisions might end up 
being counterproductive, as the concentration of risk on few large financial intermediaries increases 
risks to financial stability. Furthermore, the provisions were directly influenced by politics302, and 
influential viewpoints were sidelined303 in the process. In addition, assets such as contract rights 
(OTC-derivatives), are not, by their legal nature always capable of being safe-kept. Furthermore, the 
liability chain includes all sub-custodial agents and prime brokers, which greatly extends the scope 
of the liability.304 All this adds to costs and risks for depositaries, which are passed to hedge funds.  
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4.4. Transparency requirements  
 
AIFMD enhances transparency through various provisions as described in the earlier chapters, from 
remuneration to risk management. The specific transparency requirements of AIFMD are particularly 
related to investor disclosure and submitting annual reports.305 AIFMs are obliged to submit annual 
reports to member state authorities and investors on request. AIFMs are also required to disclose 
information to investors about investment strategy, and the objectives, types of assets AIFM is going 
to invest, usage of leverage and other important information.306 AIFM is also required to report the 
competent authorities of its home Member State on the principal markets and instruments in which it 
trades on behalf of the AIFs it manages.307  
Practical consequences 
The measures will add to the transparency of the otherwise opacious industry. More disclosure on 
hedge funds strategies, leverage and financials should lead to smoother due diligence process for 
investors and at the same time enhance trust in the industry. However, there are also drawbacks to 
more investor disclosure.  Some hedge fund strategies are extremely information sensitive, so even 
slight disclosure on strategies and types of assets may result in the fund losing competitive edge.  
 
4.5. Special provisions on leverage 
 
High leverage has been typically associated with systemic risk build-up. Pre-financial crisis era 
witnessed some extraordinary leverage with certain financial institutions. Some hedge funds were 
highly leveraged as well. However, it must emphasised that leverage is not a perfect proxy for risk, 
yet combined with other factors308 it may contribute to financial instability.309 Thus, AIFMD conveys 
that given it is possible for an AIFM to employ leverage and, under certain conditions, to contribute 
to the build-up of systemic risk or disorderly markets, special requirements should be imposed on 
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AIFMs employing leverage.310  Leverage is defined as any method by which the AIFM increases the 
exposure of an AIF it manages whether through borrowing of cash or securities, or leverage 
embedded in derivative positions or by any other means.311  
AIFMD-CDR stipulates two methods for calculating leverage, gross method and commitment 
method. Information should be provided by both methods. The gross method gives the overall 
exposure of the AIF whereas the commitment method gives insight into the hedging and netting 
techniques used by the manager; therefore both methods are to be used in conjunction.312 When 
calculating the exposure, all positions of the AIF should initially be included, including short and 
long assets and liabilities, borrowings, derivative instruments and any other method increasing the 
exposure where the risks and rewards of assets or liabilities are with the AIF, and all other positions 
that make up the net asset value.313 An AIFMD, with a leverage ratio of over three times its NAV 
calculated by the commitment method, is considered to be leveraged on a substantial basis.314 Special 
reporting requirements are imposed on such funds.315 
AIFMD also includes provisions regarding maximum leverage employed by the AIFM.  316 AIFMs 
are required the set a maximum level of leverage which they may employ, taking account, for 
instance, the size of the AIF, the investment strategy, and any other interlinkage or relevant 
relationships with other financial services institutions which could pose systemic risks. 317 Should an 
AIFM or group of AIFMs pose a substantial risk to financial stability and integrity of the financial 
system, AIFMD empowers competent authorities to set limits on leverage.318 ESMA may also 
determine that the leverage employed by an AIFM, or by a group of AIFMs, poses a substantial risk 
to the stability and integrity of the financial system and may issue advice to competent authorities 
specifying the remedial measures to be taken, including limits to the level of leverage, which that 
AIFM, or that group of AIFMs, are entitled to employ.319 
Practical consequences 
More disclosure on leverage ought to help in monitoring and assessing its implications on market 
stability. As AIFMD requires funds to provide information on the leverage and concentrations they 
                                                         
310 AIFMD, Recital 49 
311 AIFMD, Article 4, 1, (v) 
312 AIFMD-CDR, Recital 12 
313 AIFMD-CDR, Recital 14 
314 AIFMD-CDR, Recital 132 
315 AIFMD-CDR, Articles 110 and 111 
316 AIFMD, Article 15, 4 
317 AIFMD, Article 15, 4 
318 AIFMD-CDR, Recital 133 
319 AIFMD, Article 25,8 
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manage, regulators possibly have a chance to react pre-emptively before hedge fund positioning and 
leverage becomes unsustainable. However, this assumes that regulators are able to take a proactive 
stance. Thus, the ultimate impacts are rather ambiguous.  
More disclosure on large funds leverage – in conjunction with the knowledge of its strategies and 
principal markets it trades320 – may open the door on speculation against them. If other participants 
know there is a distressed participant321 in a certain market, they will seek to position against it, in 
anticipation of liquidation. This by itself could create sources of financial instability. In similar vein 
restricting hedge funds ability to use leverage could increase economic instability, because certain 
investment strategies, which smooth out volatility, require high leverage to be effective. Lastly, even 
the threat of leverage limits on certain market conditions could lead to turmoil.322 As the regulators 
are well aware of the facts, the border for intervention might remain extremely high. It is thus 
questionable, whether the special provisions on leverage will help in controlling systemic risk.  
 
4.6. Marketing   
 
AIFMD practically sees two separate marketing regimes run in parallel during a defined period of 
time, one of EU AIFs and EU AIFMs and another related to third country (TC) AIFs and AIFMs.323 
AIFMD regulates active marketing to professional investors324 in the EU of both EU AIFs, and non-
EU AIFs managed by EU and non-EU AIFMs (although AIFMs may market to retail investors under 
member states discretion).325  Practically AIFMs marketing in EU will have to comply fully with 
AIFMD, or rely on national private placement326 regimes (NPPR) and reverse solicitation327. 
AIFMD also introduces EU-wide passport for marketing of AIF similar to the principles of UCITSD 
and MiFID. The AIFMD passport may relate to (1) the cross-border management of AIFs, or (2) the 
                                                         
320 AIFMs need to report principal markets only to regulators though.  
321 Knowledge over LTCM’s positions caused otherwise non-correlated markets to exhibit substantial correlations. One 
of the most profound examples is the following. Long-Term had a small position in hurricane bonds, securities that 
permit insurers to sell the risk of a hurricane; the day Meriwether’s confidential letter leaked to investors about the 
funds distress was leaked, the bonds plummeted 20 percent, even though the probability and cost of hurricanes was 
utterly unaltered. Donald McKenzie, An engine, not a camera, how financial models shape markets, 2006, p. 234 
322 Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012, pp. 557-574 
323 See Appendix 10: Marketing in EU under AIFMD 
324 For definition see MiFID Annex 2 
325 AIFMD, Article 43,1 
326 Defined as the sale of securities to a relatively small number of select investors as a way of raising capital. 
327 The first draft of the AIFMD proposed a prohibition on reverse solicitation. However, this prohibition was ultimately 
removed from the final AIFMD. AIFMD Factsheet: Private Placement Post-AIFMD, 2013 
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cross-border sale of AIF units to professional investors.328 An authorized EU AIFM may market units 
or shares of an EU AIF that it manages to professional investors in another Member State as soon as 
it has submitted a notification to the competent authorities of its home Member State in respect of 
each EU AIF that it intends to market.329  
EU AIFM managing non-EU AIF, without marketing in EU will also be almost fully subject to 
AIFMD provisions, except requirements related to depositaries and annual reports.330 In addition, 
appropriate cooperation arrangements are required to be in place by the competent authorities of the 
home Member State of the AIFM and the supervisory authorities of the third country where the non-
EU AIF is established in order to ensure an efficient exchange of information.331  
If the AIFM managing non-EU AIF wishes to market in EU as well, the directive brings it under 
stricter provisions. For instance, AIFM will be subject to the depositary requirements. In addition the 
third country where the non-EU AIF is established cannot be listed as a Non-Cooperative Country 
and Territory by Financial Action Task Force (FATF).332 AIFMD also requires that the third country 
where the non-EU AIF is established has signed an agreement with the home Member State of the 
authorised AIFM which fully complies with the standards laid down in Article 26 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and ensures an effective exchange of information in tax 
matters, including any multilateral tax agreements. 333 
Private placement 
AIFMD allows EU member states to maintain their private placement regimes both for non-EU AIFs 
managed by EU AIFMs334 and for EU AIFs managed by non-EU AIFMs.335 However, most non-EU 
AIFMs marketing EU-AIFMs are frozen out currently, and they need to rely fully on private 
placement regimes in order to market in EU.  AIFMs using the private placement regimes, will not 
be subject to the depositary requirement336, but will still be subject to all the reporting obligations and 
third country rules regarding exchange of information.337 Member states also are given the discretion 
to impose stricter rules.338 However, the private placement regime might be abolished in the future in 
                                                         
328 Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012 pp. 367-406 
329 AIFMD, Article 32, 1 and 2 
330 AIFMD, Article 34, 1, (a) 
331 AIFMD, Article 34, 1, (b) 
332 AIFMD, Article 35, 2, (b) 
333 AIFMD, Article 35, 2, (c) 
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case ESMA and EC decide to extend the passport to non-EU AIFMs (three years after legislation has 
been adopted to extend passport).339 
As of June 2015, ESMA has concluded that the passport should be extended to Guernsey and Jersey, 
and also to Switzerland following certain amendments to relevant Swiss legislation. However, ESMA 
advises delaying the decision with regards to U.S., Hong Kong, and Singapore, due to concerns 
related to competition, regulatory issues and a lack of sufficient evidence to properly assess the 
relevant criteria.340 EC has backed up this assessment and has asked ESMA to complete its assessment 
of the regimes of the USA, Hong Kong, Singapore. In addition ESMA is to assess the extension of 
passport to Japan, Canada, Isle of Man, Cayman Islands, Bermuda and Australia by 30 June 2016.341 
Thus, it will be at earliest during 2019 when ESMA will ultimately issue technical guidance advising 
whether or not the private placement regime should be terminated.342 
Reverse solicitation 
With regards to reverse solicitation, there is no common understanding what it means, although it is 
often referred as investors approaching the fund manager for investment, which does not consist of 
marketing in the sense of AIFMD, and would be thus excluded from the scope of AIFMD.343 
However, reverse solicitation is not defined by the directive. AIFMD defines marketing as direct or 
indirect offering or placement at the initiative of the AIFM or on behalf of the AIFM of units or shares 
of an AIF it manages to or investors domiciled or with registered office in the union.344 The words 
“at the initiative of the AIFM” mean that reverse enquiries by investors will not be caught under the 
definition; thus “passive” marketing by AIFMs would not be considered to be “marketing” under the 
AIFMD. The words “direct or indirect” and “or on behalf of the AIFM” indicate that the AIFM would 
be considered to be “marketing” even if all actual marketing activity was carried out in the EU solely 
by a marketing or distribution agent.345  
However, AIMFs still need to exercise particular caution with reverse solicitation.346 According to 
FCA guidance, for instance, a confirmation from the investor that the offering or placement of units 
of shares of the AIF was made at its initiative, should normally be sufficient to demonstrate that 
                                                         
339 AIFMD, Recital 63 
340 ESMA, ESMA’s Advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the application of the 
AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs and AIFs, 2015; Linklaters, AIFMD: Extension of Passport., 2015 
341 ESMA, ESMA publishes letter from European Commission on AIFMD passport, 2016 
342 Linklaters, AIFM Directive, 2015 
343 AIFMD, Recital 70 
344 AIFMD, Article 4, 1, (x) 
345 Matheson, AIFMD Factsheet: Private Placement Post-AIFMD, 2013 
346 For instance even distributing business cards, will be likely considered marketing i.e. “trap of soliciting reverse”. See 
Bill Prew, AIFMD: the ongoing challenge with reverse solicitation in Europe, Hedge fund intelligence, 2015 
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reverse solicitation took place, provided that the confirmation is obtained before the offer or 
placement takes place. However, AIFMs should not be able to rely upon such confirmation if it has 
been obtained to circumvent the requirements of AIFMD.347  
Practical consequences 
Although the passport regime has proven in many cases to enhance single market with the UCITSD 
and is thus generally one of the principal carrots of the directive, the AIFMD marketing provisions 
exhibit several complications. As noted by Zetzsche et al., the AIFMD third country rules look like a 
power struggle, as third countries wishing to market or manage AIFs are forced under EEA law. This 
is a sign that particularly at times of crisis an attitude may be created which focuses less on quality 
and more on political and economic influence, a recipe which weakens AIF brand worldwide.348  
The AIFMD passport was intended to be a simple and cost-efficient process enabling AIFMs to 
manage and market EU AIFs in another member state, much like the UCITS passport. However, 
ESMA notes from the various submissions in response to its call for evidence349 that there is no 
consistency amongst member states, making use of the AIFMD passport a complicated, time-
consuming and expensive process.350 
The ESMA decision to delay the extensions of passport seems reasonable under this viewpoint. 
Ironically, this comes partly from the fact, that if ESMA was to extend the passport, it would be likely 
that the NPPR’s would be abolished in three years. And many participants in the fund industry prefer 
working under the NPPR’s. They have indicated that NPPR’s allow the Member States to set the 
standards imposed according to the needs of their national market and that they should remain for an 
indefinite period. Many funds thought, that the extensions of passport to non-EU AIFMs if the full 
requirements of AIFMD were imposed, had the potential to lead to significant market disruption if 
this was a precursor to switching off the NPPR.351 The general conclusion from ESMA’s summary 
of responses is that in case the passport was extended, it should run in parallel with the NPPR’s. 
Lastly, with regards to reverse solicitation, if consistency is to be achieved, further guidance is needed 
from ESMA and competent authorities.352  Some national regulators have issued guidance, but the 
border remains blurred as reverse solicitation may be interpreted differently from jurisdiction to 
                                                         
347 FCA, Financial promotion and related activities, The Perimeter Guidance Manual, Chapter 8, 8.37.11 (2)  
348 Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012, pp. 367-406 
349 ESMA, supra at 340, 2015, pp.54 
350 Victoria Younghusband, AIFMD Passport – National Private Placement Regime lives on, Charles Russel Speechlys, 
2015 
351 ESMA, supra at 340, 2015, pp.54 
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jurisdiction. For any managers with an interest in European investors, the risk of reliance of reverse 
solicitation being non-compliant with the AIFMD marketing provisions is something which managers 
must be alert to.  The fines for non-compliance are subject to regulatory discretion but constitute a 
criminal offense in some countries. Currently, the only way to address the risk is to become fully 
compliant directive or use the various national private placement regimes. 353 
Despite the negativity surrounding the AIFMD marketing regime, some notable benefits can be 
attained if the industry embraces the passport. Once authorized under AIFMD, the cross-border 
distribution will become significantly easier354 to both non-EU and EU AIFM’s. Enhanced 
competition would likely benefit investors. Large number of respondents to ESMA believed that the 
extension of passport would increase the range of possible investment opportunities for EU investors, 
resulting in increased investor’s choice. 355 
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354 ESMA, supra at 340, 2015, pp.55 
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5. Impact assessment  
5.1. Methodology  
 
The following impact assessment is twofold – initially industry response to the directive is examined, 
followed by analysis of the main impacts of the directive. The impacts are manifold and are discussed 
in the light of the industry surveys and AIFMD objectives. The follow-up analysis also takes into 
account the interplay of various subjects discussed in the earlier chapters. 
Most of the analysis on the industry response is based on surveys conducted by Preqin356, 
Multifonds357, Deloitte358 and a qualitative survey conducted by IFI Global359. The results have been 
interpreted in order to assess the impact on the industry. These surveys have been conducted during 
2014-2015, i.e. post AIFMD transposition thus the results are quite fresh. However, some earlier 
surveys are also addressed to provide depth and width to the assessment. Additional, albeit slightly 
dated surveys, include earlier surveys by Multifonds360 and Preqin361. 
There are some notable restraints with the chosen methodology. First the surveys, apart from Preqin 
surveys, include AIFMs from private equity and real estate as well, with the addition of service 
providers, which means that the results are likely slightly distorted due to industry specific factors. 
Second, responds are particularly crowded with larger funds – no direct survey on AIFMD impact on 
small to mid-size funds could be found. Third, as a result the Preqin survey has been used as the main 
source for the analysis, since it focuses solely on hedge funds of different size, and seems to be most 
unbiased with regards to fund size. Fourth, the timing and the sample groups clearly have had an 
impact on the responses. Finally, it is very likely that unbiased results could have been attained with 
                                                         
356 In July 2015 Preqin conducted a survey exclusively on 150 global hedge fund managers representing $380bn in 
assets under management. Preqin, Preqin Special Report; AIFMD in the Hedge Fund Industry, 2015 
357 Survey conducted by Multifonds, was carried out in Q2 2015 and received 62 responses from the global fund 
administration industry, including global custodians/ fund administrators (31%), asset managers (29%), third-party 
administrators (18%) and a mix of both traditional and alternative funds, including hedge funds, commodities, private 
equity, real estate, long only/mutual funds and unit trusts. Thus albeit hedge funds are largest participants of asset 
managers on the survey, the survey has admittedly mainly targeted the service provider side. This may have resulted in 
more optimistic picture with regards to AIFMD. Multifonds, Part4: The impact of AIFMD and convergence survey, 
2015, 
358 The Deloitte survey was conducted on over 150 registered/authorized AIFMs. The overwhelming majority of 
participants in survey fell with the category of the Universal Manco, i.e. funds where a single entity holds both UCITSD 
and AIFMD license and can offer management company services for both fund segments. The principle objective of the 
survey was to assess the reporting experience from the first cycle of AIFMD reporting. Deloitte, AIFMD reporting 
survey, 2015 
359 The survey was conducted on Managers with dedicated alternative assets of $197 billion, and an overall AUM of 
approximately $2.5 trillion. Interviews were also conducted with London based fund lawyers as well as a number of 
fund governance firms and consultancies. 73 organisations participated in the survey of which 71% were managers and 
41% hedge funds. IFIGlobal, The impact of AIFMD – Research survey 2014, 2014 
360 Multifonds, Part3: The impact of AIFMD and convergence survey, 2014 
361 Preqin, Global Hedge Fund Managers Respond to the AIFMD, 2014 
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a detailed survey on hedge fund industry as a whole. This could be a subject for another study. In 
particular, a field study would be necessary to confirm some of the conclusions drawn here. 
 
5.2. Survey results 
5.2.1. Compliance status and extraterritorial questions 
 
Preqin survey indicated that 82% of EU managers are AIFMD compliant and of which 90% are in 
the UK (Fig. 1).362 Thus, the implementation process in EU had gone pretty smoothly, despite the 
earlier concerns that the industry would be collectively struggling to meet the deadlines.363 However, 
current compliance status highlights the fact that US managers, are by a large, choosing either not to 
operate in EU or are preferring to use reverse solicitation for fundraising (Fig. 2). The fact that only 
a few US managers are looking to establish an EU based AIFM to take advantage of the passport 
seems to signal that the passport, has not garnered the enthusiasm some authorities may have 
visioned.364 Furthermore, it is particularly notable that the private placement regimes remain 
important particularly for Asia & rest of the world.  
Fig. 1: Hedge Fund Manager AIFMD Compliance            Fig. 2: How non-EU-based managers intend to raise 
Status by Manager Headquarters                    capital from EU-based investors in the next 18 months 
 
      Source: Preqin  
 
                                                         
362 Preqin, supra at 356, 2015  
363 Sophia Grene, AIFMD: Hedge funds drag their feet over EU regulation deadline, The Financial Times, 2014 
364 However, this could be also attributed to the fact that some managers are applying a wait and see approach and 
observe how their peers are faring in EU. Preqin, supra at 356, 2015 
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The results support the conclusions that AIFMD, from this part, is reducing competition365 and 
investors choice in EU, by excluding366 part of the US funds from accessing the EU market. A survey 
conducted by IFIGlobal arrived at a similar conclusion.367 The results highlight the danger of ‘Fortress 
Europe’ developing in the EU’s alternative fund industry as a result of AIFMD. This approach might 
be welcomed by some EU-based funds, but it will be of little benefit to the investors.368  
Although the industry has been more negative with regards to AIFMD earlier, the overall opinion 
remains uniformly negative (Fig. 3). However it is clear that European managers (excluding the UK) 
are least bearish on AIFMD – this can be explained by the fact that regulations have been traditionally 
stricter in the continental Europe, and they may benefit from the fact that it’s harder for non-EU funds 
to market in EU. In line with the previous analysis, US managers exhibit by far most negative 
perception on the directive (over 70%).  
Fig. 3: Fund Managers’ Perceptions of the Effect  Fig 4: Will EU managers choose to set up offshore 
Status by Manager Headquarters  structures to avoid costs of AIFMD 
        
                     Source: Preqin                              Source: Multifonds
      
Furthermore, UK managers exhibit more negative perception than their European peers. UK has by 
far the largest369 hedge fund industry in EU, which was used to the lax regulation prior to the crisis. 
Thus with the introduction of AIFMD, there was a danger it would result in an exodus of EU 
managers, particularly UK from EU. However, according to Multifonds, fully fledged exodus does 
not look set to occur (Fig. 4). In fact, the threat of EU managers choosing to set up offshore structures 
to avoid the additional costs of AIFMD for non-EU investors has declined significantly since 2013. 
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Still, around 50% of the respondents see that a minority or more of hedge funds will set up an offshore 
structure to avoid costs of AIFMD. The results highlight the fact that despite some AIFMs pulling 
out of UK, the directive may also offer significant benefits for them. Once authorized, cross-border 
distribution becomes significantly easier for them.  
 
5.2.2. Compliance costs and the primary concerns 
 
Doubts over the cost of complying with AIFMD have been one of the main sources of concern for 
hedge funds (Fig. 7), and the presumed high-cost levels have often been seen as the touchstone for 
the Directive’s ultimate success or failure.370 In addition to AIFMD, hedge funds have had to comply 
with numerous other costly regulations371. According to AIMA, MFA, and KPMG372, AIFMD is 
proving to be the costliest, right beside SEC registration and reporting requirements. 
The compliance costs with AIFMD are associated with one-off costs during the initial stages of 
authorization and the continuous costs for ensuring adequate reporting and compliance. In particular, 
costs from depositary and reporting have been considered the primary sources of costs, according to 
earlier Multifonds survey.373 In a similar vein, the survey indicated that the ultimately the costs will 
be passed to investors.  
As of 2015, it seems that the compliance costs have been higher than expected or as expected for the 
hedge fund industry (Fig. 5). However separately, Deloitte survey indicates that reporting costs have 
been broadly in line with expectations (Fig 6.). The survey was however conducted on larger funds 
which, tend to have high resources for compliance.  In any case, in terms of larger funds, it appears 
that the high level of costs that some feared have not materialized. This has probably also contributed 
to the fact that fewer hedge funds are likely to establish offshore structures to avoid the costs (Fig. 4). 
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Fig. 5: Fund Managers Experience to Date of           Fig. 6: How in line with expectations are the on-going  
Costs of AIFMD compliance              costs for producing AIFMD reports? 
  
                                                     Source: Preqin                   Source:Deloitte 
 
It is notable that only 18% of funds larger than 1bn report compliance costs as their primary source 
of concern. For larger funds, risks arising from uncertainty and lack of guidance are the primary 
concerns. These are primarily related to reverse solicitation for non-EU managers, and for EU-
managers to the variation in the implementation of the rules in the law of different EU member states. 
Some managers fear that regulatory bodies will make examples of firms which are inadvertently on 
the wrong side of regulation, with larger managers having more to lose if they are found breaking the 
EU laws.374 
 
However, compliance costs are particularly important to smaller hedge fund managers; 56% of 
managers with less than $100mn in AUM cited compliance costs as their greatest concern about the 
AIFMD (Fig. 7). The costs disproportionally burdening smaller hedge funds is underlined by 
IFIGlobal. It paints a particularly gloomy picture in particularly in relation to smaller managers. 
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Managers interviewed with AUMs below $1 bn say that AIFMD has increased their cost base from 
between 33% to 50%. The consensus is that a London-based hedge fund manager needs a minimum 
of $250 million in AUM to get to break even in even the simplest strategies. Hardly anyone in this 
category sees any compensating benefits from this increased expenditure. 375 
 
5.2.3. Main challenges and benefits of AIFMD  
 
The main challenge from AIFMD continues to be reporting to regulators (Fig. 8). In addition issues 
related to depositary liability, authorization process and risk management pose major challenges. The 
results are not surprising, in a sense that these provisions are the primary source administrative burden 
and costs.376  
 
Fig. 8: Challenges of AIFMD                        Fig. 9: Benefits of AIFMD 
  
Source: Multifonds 
It’s notable that AIFM industry as whole considers that greater investor protection and added 
transparency are the main benefits of AIFMD (Fig. 9). However, according to IFIGlobal, not one 
survey responded highlighted investor protection as a benefit.377 Thus, it is difficult to determine 
whether the industry sees AIFMD meeting its objective with regards to investor protection.  
With regards to the ability of AIFMD to prevent market instability and build-up of systemic risk 
respondents to Multifonds survey did not exhibit high confidence levels. Given that the AIFM 
industry as whole has been more optimistic about the impact of the directive, it seems appropriate to 
assume that hedge funds would have exhibited even more depressed perception. Unfortunately, 
however, such information was not available at the time of the research to confirm this hypothesis. 
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5.2.4. Convergence is inevitable 
 
One of the key findings from the Multifonds survey is that fund managers expect significant 
convergence between long-only and hedge funds (Fig. 12). The convergence is a direct result of 
AIFMD but also investor demand378 for regulated hedge funds.  Institutional investors expect higher 
risk management, transparency, and liquidity resulting in hedge funds that have more traditional, 
long-only fund characteristics. Similarly, retail orientated hedge funds, i.e. newcits, are driving 
traditional funds to incorporate hedge fund characteristics such as performance fees. These drivers 
aligned with the AIFMD have accelerated the convergence.379 
Fig. 10: Convergence of traditional and alternatives Fig. 11: AIFMD becoming an international brand 
 
  
Source: Multifonds 
 
With such ongoing convergence comes the question whether AIFMD will rival UCITS as a dominant 
vehicle for cross-border funds. Overall AIFM industry seems to support this viewpoint, as 87% of 
respondents believe that AIFMD will at some point rival UCITS as a global ‘de facto’ international 
standard (Fig. 13). The UCITS brand is the main European framework for retail investors, but over 
the years has been used by institutional investors and, in the absence of another regulated vehicle, its 
structure has been extended to cater for alternative strategies. 
With its foundations now in place, AIFMD offers a viable alternative for regulated alternative 
structures within the EU. While originally addressed to professional investors, AIFMD also has the 
capacity to target the retail sector.380 However, due to the requirement of case-by-case assessment, 
                                                         
378 Since 2009, compound annual growth in UCITS absolute return funds has been 47% compared to only 5% for 
offshore hedge funds. See Appendix 12: Growth in the hedge fund sector 
379 Jonathan Boyd, Convergence of long only and hedge funds to accelerate under AIFMD – survey, Investment Europe, 
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380 AIFMD, Recital 71 
59 
 
it’s likely that only certain strategies may be marketed. Yet in any case, the provisions allow AIFM 
diversity whether they want to be regulated under AIFMD, UCITSD or both.  
 
5.3. Analysis of the main impacts of the directive 
 
This section seeks to analyse the main impacts of the directive, in light of the industry surveys and 
the themes discussed in the previous chapters. In line with the goals of this research, the impact on 
systemic risk, investor protection, cross-border fund distribution and funds by size is evaluated.  
Impact on funds by size  
AIFMD brings the era of alternative investment fragmentation to an end, which has a significant 
impact on funds by size. The results of IFIGlobal survey suggest that the AIFMD winners are 
managers that have UCITS fund ranges and/or multi-billion organizations.381 These funds have the 
capacity and infrastructure in place to benefit from the AIFMD and comply with the costs. On the 
other hand, the traditional hedge fund boutiques are likely to suffer greatly.  
For larger funds the directive is more of an opportunity, than a threat. The newly emerging AIFMD-
compliant funds and universal Mancos will be able to tap larger investor base and thus increase the 
assets under management within the industry. This is likely to increase competition and convergence 
between large fund houses. Convergence may lead to increased investors choice, from this part, as 
more investors can access previously hedge fund-like strategies.   
Further consolidation is also evident382, as smaller funds are acquired by larger outfits. The positive 
impact will be increased investor protection and transparency, as assets are concentrated under well-
regulated entities. Yet, asset concentration might also build systemic risk by increasing correlation of 
strategies.  
As overwhelmingly suggested by the surveys, smaller funds are significantly burdened by the costs 
of the directive. The one-size-fits-all approach of AIFMD leads to barriers of entry and even to market 
exit383 in some cases. This will stunt innovation as it’s significantly harder to establish a start-up fund.  
Furthermore, decreased competition with regards to niche strategies is likely, which will reduce 
                                                         
381 IFIGlobal, supra at 359, 2014 
382 BNY Mellon, supra at 211, 2014 
383 IFIGlobal, supra at 359, 2014 
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market efficiency384 in certain markets. For instance, larger fund outlets often ignore less liquid 
markets for SME shares. Thus, one of the primary negative consequences of the directive remains its 
impact on small hedge funds. 
There are three primary arguments supporting one-size-fits-all approach. First, by leveling the playing 
field, AIFMD ensures fair and uniform treatment of AIFMs across EEA. Second, aggregation effects 
from smaller funds may cause systemic risks.385 Third, the directive emphasises the application of the 
principle of proportionality, to soften the blow in some cases. However considering the 
overwhelmingly negative response from the hedge fund industry, it can be concluded that the 
principle of proportionality is not being applied in a sufficient manner. Furthermore, the directive 
contradicts the principles outlined in G20386, that only systemically important hedge funds should be 
brought under regulatory oversight. The fact that smaller hedge funds managed to deleverage387 in a 
more orderly manner than larger funds during the financial crisis suggests the aggregation effect is 
also exaggerated. 
Impact on cross-border distribution  
On the surface, one of the main benefits of the directive is that once compliant, EU AIFMs will be 
able to market across EEA. Thus, according to the Multifonds survey, the view of the AIFM industry 
is that AIFMD may rival UCITSD as a dominant vehicle for cross-border distribution. However, the 
results must be interpreted in a European context. As described by PWC survey388 on institutional 
investors, AIFMD hands a competitive advantage to EU funds. There are also some significant 
problems with regards to AIFMD third country rules, possible abolition of the NPPRs and reverse 
solicitation. 
First of all, survey results from Preqin389 highlight that US managers are partly avoiding the EU 
market. As US is the largest domicile for hedge fund managers, the third country provisions restricting 
non-EU AIFMs from access to passport significantly reduce investor’s choice, market efficiency and 
competition across EEA. Second, also according to Preqin, various third countries prefer working 
                                                         
384 Effects from hedge funds market inefficiency seeking behaviour can impact the real economy significantly. An 
example would be a long short/equities fund, who buys under-priced and shorts overpriced SME companies. By driving 
prices towards rational levels, hedge funds help to allocate capital to the firms who use it most productively.  Larger 
fund outfits, do not often trade such markets as it’s not efficient for them to allocate capital on smaller companies.  
385 AIFMD, Recital 17 
386 G20, supra at 18, 2009 
387 Rock Creek Capital, calculated that hedge funds with assets under $1 billion were down a relatively modest 12 
percent in 2008. Meanwhile the funds that Rock Creek tracked with $1 billion to $10 billion in assets were down 16 
percent, and those with more than $10 billion were down 27 percent. Mallaby, supra at 109, 2010, pp. 372 
388 See ref. 376 
389 See Ch. 5, 5.2 Compliance status and extraterritorial questions, Fig. 1. 
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under the NPPR’s, confirming that the abolition of NPPRs, would lead to a significant market 
disruption. Third, it does not help that the rules on reverse solicitation are not harmonized at EU level. 
Respondents to Preqin survey highlight that reverse solicitation remains primary method for obtaining 
clients from EU – lack of guidance with regards to it is a primary concern to larger non-EU funds. 
Thus obtaining clients by reverse solicitation, continues to pose a risk. The industry has repeated calls 
for clarification, to no avail.  
Thus, as it currently stands, the AIFMD impact on cross-border distribution appears to be net 
negative. The implementation has been far from smooth.390 And the rules continue to exhibit 
protectionist elements. Yet the passport regime has undoubtedly potential. It has already likely 
increased competition between EU-AIFMs and allowed for further deepened the single market.391 
The subsiding negativity of UK funds also to reflects this.  
Impact on investor protection  
Whilst the industry opinion with regards to investor protection remains mixed, a look at the provisions 
suggests that AIFMD counters the issues related to investor protection laid out in chapter 2 of this 
research. AIFMD can prevent market abuse, increase transparency and enhance the code of conduct 
rules on the industry. In the long term, the directive may improve the battered reputation of the 
industry and contribute to better understanding of alternative investment among politicians, media, 
and the general public. At the same time, more disclosure will assist in distinguishing unscrupulous 
managers.392  
AIFMD should significantly decrease the chances of market abuse, such as fraud. By harmonizing 
the depositaries, AIFMD prevents the selling of black-box investment strategies. In addition by 
standardizing redemption policies, AIFMD has a chance at increasing investor protection in a sense 
that gates and lock ups will not be issued arbitrarily. AIFMD further reigns some of the controversial 
practices such as excessive remuneration. Some of the rules are even self-explanatory, as they are 
necessary, such as the fiduciary rules e.g. conflict of interests, fair treatment of investors and the 
disclosure on persons conducting the business.  
                                                         
390 See Ch. 4, 4.6 Marketing 
391 However hedge fund industry is already quite global in nature, thus the net positive effects from single market 
deepening could be much less profound compared to other AIFMs. It is likely that private equity and real estate markets 
will exhibit significant deepening with the AIFMD. These views were already expressed in the Europe Economics ex-
ante impact assessment, and seem to have been clarified by the surveys. See Europe Economics, supra at 26, 2009 
392 OpenEurope, supra at 26, 2009  
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It was outlined by EC, that hedge funds do not always provide sufficient information for investors to 
assess the risks of their investments.393AIFMD remedies this situation. By allowing some knowledge 
on hedge fund strategies394, leverage, and risks, it should be easier for investors to assess whether the 
risk/return relationship of a fund is feasible for them.  
However, with some investor protection provisions, it certainly remains debatable whether AIFMD 
reaches too far. This is a symptom of political influence on legislation, which is particularly evident 
with the depositary liability (and separately, with the marketing provisions). Furthermore, on a more 
ideological level, the directive does little to promote freedom of choice. Many investors have 
expressed that they did not need more information than they were already getting and that they were 
perfectly happy how the funds operate currently.395 Lastly, the trade-off between investor protection 
and burdening smaller funds may be excessive. 
Impact on systemic risk 
The view taken in this research is that the impact of the directive on systemic risk remains equivocal. 
This conclusion emerges from that fact that despite sound intentions, without regulatory discretion, 
the directive may do more harm than good.  
First, the leverage limits are unlikely to lead to any beneficial impacts. Regulatory intervention with 
regards to limiting leverage also, ought to increase the risk of a backlash. Thus, the border for 
intervention should remain high.396 Second, evidence397 from the financial crisis and the collapses of 
Amaranth and LTCM provides that indirect regulation by regulating service providers is typically 
enough to limit the repercussions on systemically important financial institutions. Thus, the reasoning 
for pre-emptive action with regards to credit channel risks seems unjustified. Third, one of the direct 
consequence of the directive is consolidation and convergence of funds. Increased correlation of 
strategies and asset concentration may increase systemic risk.398 Considering these point of views, it 
is no wonder the industry remains sceptical on the systemic risk provisions. 
                                                         
393 EC, supra at 4 
394 To author’s knowledge, AIFMD remains flexible in a sense that if a strategy is extremely information sensitive, 
minimal disclosure is enough.  
395 IFIGlobal, supra at 359, 2014, pp.9 
396 See also Ch. 4, 4.5 Leverage and systemic risk 
397 See Ch. 2, 2.4,1 Systemic risks 
398 Lo, supra at 120, 2008, pp. 5 
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Yet it must be noted, that despite the shortcomings, the directive might still be a step forward, subject 
to some reservations.  By harmonizing the risk399and liquidity management practices, the directive 
ensures consistency. It is also notable that without comprehensive data on hedge-fund characteristics 
such as assets under management, leverage, counterparty relationships, and portfolio holdings, it is 
virtually impossible to draw inferences about the systemic risks posed by hedge funds. 400 AIFMD 
remedies this situation and ensures consistency in data collection throughout the EEA, which was not 
evident before the directive. The competent authorities will have the power to assess the implications 
of asset concentration, leverage, liquidity and the positioning of hedge funds for the first time. In an 
ideal401 situation, with the access to this wide array of data, competent authorities and ESMA will be 
to identify risks and take necessary action to react pre-emptively to market channel problems.  
Such action ought to consist of a constant dialogue with the industry participants and as outlined by 
Dorsenfeir, voluntary deleveraging402. This should prevent chaotic fires sales which could stem from   
the imposition of outright leverage restrictions. As such, despite all the pessimism, AIFMD might 
help in softening the blow during future crises while ensuring there won’t be such a hard landing from 
deleveraging as during the last crisis.  
  
                                                         
399 However, with regards to industry view, there is a great deal of doubt as to whether AIFMD’s risk management 
provisions are really a compliance matter (some sort of box-ticking exercise) or something potentially more 
fundamental. See IFIGlobal, supra at 359, 2013 
400 Lo, supra at 120, 2008, pp. 3 
401 Alternative view on this is that regulators have too much data due to data overlaps, and they won’t be able to identify 
any threats. An example of this reporting is manager surveyed by IFIGlobal, who claims he has to report certain trades 
11 different times, since he uses a lot derivative instruments. See IFIGlobal, supra at 359, 2013 
402 See Zetzsche, supra at 10, 2012, pp. 557-574 
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6. Conclusions  
 
In the introduction section of this study, it was outlined that there are only a few, if any post-
implementation impact assessments made on the impacts of the AIFM directive on European hedge 
fund industry. The goal of this research was to partly fill this gap by examining the latest industry 
response to the directive while interpreting the results alongside the content of the directive. The 
findings were analysed in particular from the perspective of AIFMD impact on systemic risk, investor 
protection, cross-border fund distribution, and funds by size.  
To fully comprehend the various factors influencing the recent hedge fund regulation in the form of 
AIFMD, the study also examined the background behind the directive and provided an overview of 
the hedge fund industry. It was demonstrated that hedge funds as a group are heterogeneous with 
regards to structures, risks and strategies, which makes them difficult to regulate. They also bring 
significant benefits in terms of market efficiency, liquidity, and risk distribution. As typically only 
sophisticated investors invest in them, there were compelling reasons to leave the industry at the 
mercy of self-regulation. 
However, the financial crisis led to thorough re-assessment of financial regulation, which coincided 
with a paradigm shift in hedge fund regulation from indirect to direct regulation. It was concluded, 
that in line with objectives of AIFMD and financial regulation in general, systemic risk oversight and 
investor protection were the most compelling reasons for hedge fund regulation. 
With the evidence403, available it was difficult to determine the impact of the AIFM directive on 
systemic risk. As regulators have access to a wide array of relevant data, there is a chance they can 
identify systemic risk build-up and react to relevant market channel risks in an orderly fashion. Yet 
it is hard to determine whether regulators will actually be able to use this data to their benefit. 
Furthermore, without extreme discretion, regulatory intervention may even amplify risks.  
The impact on investor protection may be one of leading benefits of the directive. Whilst remaining 
burdensome for the industry, harmonization of some divergent practices such as depositaries, 
remuneration, valuation and risk management are likely to enhance market integrity and prevent 
                                                         
403 It must be noted that since the directive has been in force for such a short period of time, and due to data constraints, 
some of the conclusions stated here remain far-sighted. A more detailed study should be carried out to substantiate some 
of the claims.  
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excessive risk-taking. Investors also stand to benefit from increased transparency and disclosure 
which is likely to lead to smoother due diligence process. 
Although it was acknowledged, that prudent regulation of hedge funds is necessary, the directive 
exhibits some externalities which are of little benefit for achieving its objectives. In particular, the 
trade-off between investor protection and excessive burdening of smaller hedge funds is too high. 
Thus in order to reap the full benefits from the industry, while retaining its objective with regards to 
systemic risk and investor protection, certain amendments should be made.  
More convincing exemptions should be provided with regards to smaller funds, and the different risk 
profile of hedge funds should be recognized. Thus, funds below 500 million in gross notional 
exposures, should be fully exempt from the directive. This threshold should be enough from systemic 
risk perspective, given that there’s little evidence smaller funds – even if leveraged – transmit 
systemic risk. The risks associated with aggregation effect and failures of such funds are countered 
by indirect regulation of service providers. Furthermore, the directive should distinguish between 
low-risk and high-risk strategies more convincingly. Strategies, such as merger arbitrage, which are 
less volatile and pursue steady absolute returns, should be exempt from some of the burdening 
provisions, such as functional and hierarchical separation of risk management and some of the 
reporting obligations such as risk reporting. 
Allowing NCA’s to impose stricter rules and registration requirements, ought to be enough for such 
funds in line with the pre-existing system. This would ensure market efficiency and significantly 
decrease the borders of entry to the industry. Thus, this ‘de facto’ de-harmonization should counter 
the negative consequences of the one-size-fits-all approach. 
Furthermore, the extraterritorial rules of AIFMD continue to exhibit negative consequences. Despite 
facilitating cross-border distribution within EEA, as it currently stands, the third country rules 
significantly inhibit the directives chance of increasing investor’s choice, market efficiency and 
competition across EEA. Allowing US funds access to the European market should be of paramount 
importance from this perspective. In addition, in case the passport was extended to the US and other 
third countries, it should run in parallel with the national private placement regimes indefinitely. This 
would ensure that hedge funds are not forced under EU law and also prevent market disruption. And 
lastly, the rules on reverse solicitation ought to be clarified at Union level as soon as possible, in order 
to reduce legal and business uncertainty. 
Thus, the ultimate conclusion of this thesis is that despite investor protection and systemic risk 
remaining convincing themes for hedge fund regulation, as it currently stands, the directive remains 
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flawed. A more feasible piece of hedge fund regulation – both economically and in terms of impacts 
– could have been probably better achieved with much longer consultation period and without 
political influence. As put by Andrew Lo; “Financial markets do not need more regulation; they need 
more effective regulation”.404 Despite righteous intentions, AIFMD does not fulfill the criteria.  
 
                                                         
404 Lo, supra at 120, 2008 
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Appendix 1: Breakdown of hedge fund strategies 
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Appendix 3: Hedge fund domiciliation 
 
 
Source: Oliver Wyman, Domiciles of Alternative Investment Funds, 2014 
 
 
Appendix 4: Efficient frontier analysis with hypothetical hedge fund allocation 
 
 
HF: Return of HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Hedge Fund Index 2000 to 2007 
EQ: Return of SP500 2000 to 2007 
FI: Return of US treasuries from 2000 to 2007 
Source: John Linder, Neil Rue and Allan Emkin, Hedge Funds in an Institutional Portfolio, 2011 Pension Consulting 
Alliance Inc. 
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Appendix 5: Leverage position in the hedge fund industry from 2000 to 2008 
 
 
Source: Charles River Associates, Impact of the proposed AIFM Directive across Europe, 2009 
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Appendix 6: Selected hedge fund disasters and losses 
 
 
Source: Roger W. Ferguson, JR, Philip Harlman, Fabio Panetta and Richard Portes, International Financial Stability, 
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Appendix 7: AIFMD Timeline 
 
Source: Dirk A. Zetzsche  (ed.), The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, Wolters Kluwer, Law & 
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Appendix 8: The objectives of AIFMD 
 
 
Source: EC, Commission staff working document; Impact assessment accompanying the document commission 
delegated regulation supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regards 
to exemptions, general operating conditions, depositories, leverage, transparency and supervision, 2012 
 
Appendix 9: Calculation for minimum regulatory capital  
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Appendix 10: Marketing in EU under AIFMD 
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Appendix 11: Impact of regulations in terms of compliance costs 
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Appendix 12: Growth of the European hedge fund industry  
 
 
 
Source: J.P.Morgan, Can AIFMD act as catalyst for growth of the European hedge fund industry, 2015 
